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ries v. Harrison,30 Ark. 79 ; Selover v. Commercial, 7 Cal. 266 ;
Price v. Sanc ez, 8 Fla. 136; Smith v. Hewett, 13 Iowa 94, 96;
Odell v. Lee, 14 Id. 411, 413), and that transfers between husband and wife shall be recorded: Jones, 19 Iowa 239, 240 ; Teague
v. -Downs,69 N. 0. 280, 287; Lewis v. Caperton, 8 Gratt. 148,
165; and it seems that general statutes which provide that "no
property whereof the grantor shall remain in possession, shall pass
as against his creditors unless by bill of sale duly recorded" (Md.
R. 0. 1878, sect. 45, p. 890), apply to all transfers between
husband and wife where the grantor apparently remains in possession. So that not only to meet the difficulty of proving delivery
(-Enders v. 'Williams, 1 let. (Ky.) 346, 350;) but also to rebut
the presumption of fraud (.Ex parte Cox, L. R., I Oh. Div. 302,
806; Ware v. Gardner, L. R., 7 Eq. 317, 321), transfers between husband and wife should be by formal instrument duly
recorded.
DAVID STEWART.
Baltimore, ld.

RECENT ENGLISH

DECISIONS.

Court of Appeal.
WIALLEY v. LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY CO.
In consequence of an extraordinary rainfall water accumulated against an embankment of the defendants. Thereupon they cut trenches through the embankment
and caused the water to flow on to the plaintiff's land. The act of the defendants was
reasonably necessary for the protection of their property, but caused more damage
to the plaintiff than if the water had been allowed to percolate the embankment.
Held, on appeal, that the defendants were liable for the damage which, but for
their act in cutting the trenches, would not have happened to the plaintiff.
APPEAL of the defendants from the judgment of DAY, J., at
trial.
The defendants were the owners of a railway embankment
standing on sloping ground. On August 30th 1883, owing to an'
extraordinary rainfall a quantity of water accumulated on the
upper side of the slope against the embankment. In order to
protect the embankment the defendants cut trenches through it,
thereby causing the water to flow on to the plaintiff's land, which
was on the lower side of the slope, and to do damage, in respect of
which he brought an action against the defendants.
VoL. XXXII.-80
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At the trial the jury found that the defendants cut the trenches
and caused the 'water to flow over the land of the plaintiff; also,
that the cutting the trenches was reasonably necessary for the
protection of their property. The plaintiff claimed 1961., but the
damage was assessed by the jury at 1261., the difference representing the damage which would have been caused to the plaintiffs
if the defendants had not cut the trenches.
DAY, J., having entered judgment for the plaintiff on the findings, the defendants appealed.
Carles Russell, Q. 0., and Henn Collins, Q. C., for the appellants.
Gully, Q. C., and Part,for the respondent.
BRETT, M. R.-In this case the defendants are the owners of a
railway, and of an embankment on which it stands. They were
probably authorized by statute to take from other people the land
upon which the embankment stood, and to build and use the embankment as a railway embankment. The embankment stands
upon sloping ground, so that upon one side of it the ground is
higher than upon the other. An extraordinary storm of rain
arose, by which the land on the upper side was flooded, and the
body of water being stopped by the embankment, restedagainst it
and endangered its safety. Thereupon the defendants cut trenches
through the embankment, the necessary effect of doing which was
that the water which had been resting against the upper side of
the embankment passed through these openings in a different way
from that in which it would have percolated the embankment, and
by reason of its passing through in that way it damaged the plaintiff's land. The question is, whether the defendants are liable to
the plaintiff.. The jury, in effect, found that from the way in
which .they cut the embankment the water did more damage than
if it had been allowed to percolate it. They also found that what
the defendants did was reasonably necessary for the protection of
their property.
-The proposition of the defendants is that when the water, by an
extraordinary misfortune, had accumulated against their property,
they had a right, in order to get rid of that misfortune, it being
reasonable for the safety of their own property to do so, to take
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active measures, the necessary effect of which was to injure their
neighbor's property. Several cases were cited to enable us to
arrive at the principle upon which to act. In some cases you may
have property which is in such a position with regard to your
neighbor's that it must be injured if he is to use his property at all
in the natural way. Therefore your property is, in the course of
nature, subject to a defect. If he may not use his property in the
natural way, you have, by reason of the defect in your property,
transferred the defect to him, because, if he does so use it, he will
injure your property. A mine on a lower level than another is a
property with a defect, for, unless the owner can prevent the upper
mine being used in the ordinary way, his property must suffer
from the consequence of its defective position. The law will not
allow you to transfer to your neighbor the defect in your property,
so that, if he uses his property in the ordinary and natural way,
any damage which may thereby arise to you is solely due to the defect
to which your property is subject, and he is not liable. Unless
you can prevent that damage, by transferring it to your neighbor,
your land must suffer from the natural consequence of its position.
This was so in H1enzies v. Breadalbane, 3 Bli. N. S. 414, where
the land was so situated with regard to a river, that, if the river
left the natural course, it would, in the course of nature, wash the
land away. But you cannot alter the course of nature which has
made your land of less value, and transfer that loss and defect to
your neighbor's land, by doing something to cure that defect which
must throw it upon his land. It seems to me that the mining cases
and the case of Menzies v. Breadalbanego upon the same principle
-viz., that a man has no right to cure the natural defect of his
land by transferring it to the land of another.
Then you come to another class of cases where an extraordinary
danger threatens you. You have a right to defend yourself against
such a danger before it has occurred and is completed, and you do
prevent it by doing something which is to protect yourself. The
danger is so far common that, if you do prevent it coming to you,
it will happen to your neighbor. Then, for the protection of your
property, you may prevent the danger happening to you, and if
the natural consequence of so doing is that it must happen to some
one else, that is not your fault; you have done an active act which
is to protect yourself, and you are not answerable because that
which has been diverted from you has done mischief to some one
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else. That is laid down in the cases of Mield v. The London and
.North-Western 1?ailway Co., L. R., 10 Ex. 4, and The Zing v.
The Pagham Commissioners, 8 B. & 0. 355.
Now you come to the case where there is something which,
being in existence, is injurious to your property. The question is
whether if, by any active act of yours, you get rid of and cure that
which has happened to you, and which, if things xemain as they
are, would not happen to your neighbor, you are not entitled to do
something which will cause misfortune to your neighbor. It has
been held that, if you bring something on to your own land, or, at
all events, bring yourself into a position with regard to your property, so that, if you do not take precaution against what you
have yourself done, injury will be caused thereby to your neighbor;
then, although you do not do any subsequent act, you are liable, if
such injury has been caused, because you have put him in danger
and have not guarded him against it-as, for instance, where you
have brought on to your land water which, if it escapes, must injure
your neighbor, you are liable, although the .water has escaped
without any subsequent act of yours.
It was suggested that, if you have not brought the danger there,
that makes a difference. So it does. If the water comes on to
your land without any act of yours and breaks in on to your neighbor's land, I take it that you are not liable for its having passed
over your land. Both have suffered from a common and extraordinary danger. But if, although you have not brought the
danger on to your own land, an extraordinary danger has come
there, which was a danger both to you and your neighbor, but has
ceased as regards him and is complete as regards you, and if, by
leaving the thing as it is, nothing will happen to him, and then, in
order to get rid of the misfortune to yourself, you do something
which is to transfer it to. him, you are acting contrary to the wellknown maxim that when you have a choice so to use your own
property as not to endanger your neighbor's, you must not elect
that use which will endanger his, but that which will not. This
present case is a little more complicated, for that would solve the
case if there had b~en no danger to the embankment, and the embankment would have stopped the water so that it would not have
got on to part of the plaintiff's land if the embankment had not been
cut through. In that case it seems to me that, if you cut it through
in order to get rid of the danger to your own property, you would
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be liable. But here the water would have gone on to the plaintiff's
land in another way, though, if it had been allowed to percolate
the embankment, it would not have done him so much damage.
Therefore the defendants have done something for the preservation
of their property, and have thereby transferred their misfortune to
the plaintiff, and they are therefore liable.
But it is said that they are not liable because they have only
used the embankment for the ordinary purpose of the railway, andi
therefore that the case is within the principle that the plaintiff had
his land subject to a defeet on account of its neighborhood to the
railway. If you have land near a railway which is subject to a
defect arising from the ordinary user of a railway, you must suffer,
and cannot recover; but it is to my mind impossible to say that to
cut through an embankment is the ordinary way of using a railway. Therefore the case comes within the more general proposition, and an extraordinary misfortune had fallen upon the defendants,
who, if they had allowed things to remain as they were, would have
been the sufferers, but who, in order to get rid of that misfortune,
did something which brought injury upon the plaintiff, and for so
doing they are liable according to all rules. I am therefore of
opinion that the judgment appealed from was right, and should be
affirmed.
. BAGGALLAY,

L. J.-I

agree so entirely with the classification by
the Master of the Rolls of the principles applicable to cases more or
less resembling the present one, that I shall say nothing more on
that point, but confine my observations to the application of the
principles to the circumstances of the case in question. [His lordship stated the facts and continued:] We find that the defendants
had not prevented the flood coming upon their land. When they
found the water on their land they might have left it to take its
course, in which case I do not think that if the plaintiff had suffered
damage, he could have had any right against the defendant. But
when they took upon themselves to do what they thought best,
they had to take the risk of that which they did which was found
by the jury to have damaged the plaintiff. I think that is the
result of an application of the above principles. I am, therefore,
of opinion that the appeal must be dismissed.
LINDLEY,

L. J.-I

am of the same opinion.

I do not feel a
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difficulty in deciding the particular case, but it is difficult to enunciate a prihciple common to this and other cases. This is a case
in which the defendants made an embankment, against which water
accumulated after an unusual rainfall to the extent that it was
dangerous not to do something or other. In order to save the
embankment they cut trenches in it, and turned the water so as to
damage the land of the plaintiff, to whom they have not paid compensation. Certainly, it is surprising that if the defendants are
not liable for so using their land as practically to send water on to
their neighbor's land, there is no authority to support 'that proposition. Primafacie,it is for the defendants to justify what they
have done, and it is material to consider that they cannot find
any authority. It is said that the mining cases are an authority.
I cannot see that they are. The difference has been pointed
out by the Master of the Rolls, and also by COTTON, L. J., in
Hurdman v. North-Basterpt Railway Co., 3 C. P. Div. 168,
where he says, at p. 174: " But excavating and raising the minerals is considered the natural use of mineral land, and these
denisions are referable to this principle, that the owner of land
holds his right to the enjoyment thereof, subject to such annoyance
as is the consequence of what is called the natural user by his
neighbor of his land, and that when an interference with this enjoyinent by something in the nature of nuisance (as distinguished from
an interruption or disturbance of an easement or right of property
in ancient lights, or the support for the surface to which every
owner-of property is entitled), is the cause of complaint, no action
can be maintained if this is the result of the natural user by a
It appears to me that this case is not
neighbor of his land."
to the cases, of Menzies v. Breadalbut
rather
analogous to those,
bane and Neild v. London and 2orth- Western Railway Co. It
seems to me to be established by those cases, that, if an extraordinary flood is coming upon a man's land, he may, in order to
protect his land, turn it away, and that he is not responsible for
the consequences, even though his neighbor may be injured. The
case of R. v. The Pagham Commissioners is another step in the
same direction. There is a difference between the cases where
the damage is caused by way of protection from injury which has
not happened and where injury has occurred. The squib case,
mentioned in the judgment of GOULD, J., in Scott v. Shepherd, is,
in point of principle, nearer to this one.
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One must look to the broad question whether the owner of land
on which, without any act on his part, there has occurred a sudden
accumulation of water, is at liberty actively to let it go off on to
the land of his neighbor without compensating him, and whether
he is justified on the ground that it was to save his property.
There is no authority to support that. It appears to me that the
general rights and duties of landowners are against that. In my
view, the decision appealed from was right, and the appeal must be
dismissed.
BRETT, M. R-I do not adopt the distinction drawn by the
counsel for the respondent between operations underground and on
the surface. I think that, if my property is so situated with
regard to the property of a neighbor that, by an ordinary act of
agricultural process, he makes a natural drain through which an
ordinary flood sends water on to my land, my land would be subject to that defect, and I could not recover. With regard to the
case of the squib, in my opinion it can only be upheld on the view
that the squib is, in such a case, a danger to all, and is never in
the possession of any one, and that, by throwing it out of the coach,
the man is only preventing it coming into his possession.
Appeal dismissed.
The subject-of surface water and the
rights and liabilities of landowners in
respect to the same has been much considered of late in the American courts,
resulting in considerable difference of
opinion among them. For while there
is a substantial agreement upon the precise point involved in the principal case,
viz., that surface water cannot be artificially gathered into a stream or flow,
and so conducted by an artificial channel
upon an adjoining landowner to his
injury: (See Dickinson v. Worcester, 7
Allen 19 ; Butler v. Peck, 16 Ohio St.
334; Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis..
223, and many other cases;) yet the
authorities do not agree as to the rights
and liabilities of the parties, while and
so long as the water continues to be
mere surface water, in precisely its natural fall or condition, unaffected by
artificial causes.

Many courts hold that surface water
differs entirely from running water collected in a natural stream or flow, and
that every landowner has a right either
to detain such water on his own premises
for his own use, or to obstruct its flow
on to his land by embankment or otherwise, and thereby flow it back upon his
neighbor above, and without any legal
liability in either case. This view is
strongly supported by the following
among many other cases: Gannon v.
.Uargadon, 10 Allen 106; Luther v.
Winniseninet Co., 9 Cash. 171 ; Franklinv. Visk, 13 Allen 211 ; .31orrill v.
Burley, 120 Mass. 99 ; Buftbm v. Harris, 5 R. I. 243; Bowlsby v. Speer, 31
v. Hudson, 27
N. J. Law 352; o1/oyt
Wise. 656. Taylor v. Fickas, 64 Ind.
168, is a late and veryv'aluable case on
this point.
And by "surface water" in these
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cases, is meant not only what comes from
falling rains 6r melting snows, but also
such as, oozing from the ground, or bubbling up from gentle springs finds its
way over the surface or among the loose
tussocks, but is not gathered into a
stream or volume with a channel, bed
and banks. It is the latter circumstance
which emphatically changes the flow
from that of surface water to a watercourse, the law of which is so entirely
different.
See Luther v. Winnisiwmet
Co, 9 Cush. 171 ; Ashby v. Wolcott, 10
Id. 195; Shields v. Arndt, 3 Green Ch.
R. 246.
On the other hand it is often held
that surface water cannot be detained or
set back upon an upper proprietor, any
more than a natural stream, and that the
same rules apply to both: and such has
been said to be the civil law on this subject. See as supporting this viewespecially in farming lands: Ogburn v.
Conner, 46 Cal. 346 ; repudiating the
Massachusetts rule on this subject. See
also, Gillham v. Madison County R. R.
Co., 49 Ill. 484; Gormley v. Sanford,
52 Id. 161 ; Porter v. Durham, 74 N.
C. 767; Adams v. Walker, 34 Conn.
466. That such was the civil law is
abundantly shown by the cases of Latti-
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more v. Davis, 14 La. 161 ; Hays v.
Hays, 19 Id. 351; Bowman v. New
Orleans, 27 La. Ann. 501. Indeed the
Louisiana code seems to expressly provide for such a case.
A somewhat intermediate view seems
to have prevailed in Swett v. Cutts, 50
N. H. 439, in which it was held that a
landowner's right to obstruct water not
gathered into a stream but spreading over
the surface in the season of heavy rains
or melting snows, depends upon the
reasonableness of such a use of his land
in each. particular case; and that in
determining this question all the circumstances of the case would of course be
considered, and among them the nature
and importance of the improvements
sought to be made, the extent of the
interference with the water, and the
amount of injury done to the other landowners, as compared with the value of
such improvements, and also whether
such injury could or could not have been
originally foreseen. This is applying
substantially the same rule to surface
water as to percolating water, as laid
down in the important case of Bassett
v. Salisbury M[anuf. Co., 43 N. H. 569,
and certainly has much to commend it.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.
GLEASON v. GLEASON.
M1ere rudeness of language, petulance of manner, austerity of temper or even
occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not constitute
legal cruelty.
APPEAL

from Fillmore County.

J. H. Rushton & W. J. Lamb, for plaintiff.
P. J Aaule & J. W. .iler, for defendant.
MAXWELL, J.-This action was brought by the plaintiff against
the defendant in the District Court of Fillmore County; for a
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divorce upon the ground of cruelty. On the trial of the cause the
court found for the defendant and dismissed the action. The
plaintiff appeals to this court, the principal ground of complaint
being that the finding is against the weight of evidence. It
appears from the record that the plaintiff was married to the
defendant in July, 1881, and that they lived together as husband
and wife until March, 1883; that the plaintiff is fifty-two years of
age, and the defendant about the same age. At the time of the
marriage the plaintiff had living with him a son about nine years
old, and the defendant a little girl. These children, and the
plaintiff and defendant, and a girl hired to do housework, constituted the family. The principal facts of cruelty set out in the
petition consist of vile, profane, abusive language by the defendant to the plaintiff, the charge of incest and abusive words of the
plaintiff's son. Some of the facts charged, if fully proved, would
be a sufficient cause for a divorce: Kelly v. Kelly, 11 Pac. Rep.
194; Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 5
N. W. Rep. 689. In the case last cited the action was by the
wife against the husband for a divorce because the defendant had
became addicted to habitual drunkenness, and was guilty of such
inhuman treatment as to endanger the life of the wife. The court
says (page 692): "Taking into consideration the acts of personal
violence, the foul language and the defendant's unfortunate habit
(of becoming intoxicated), we cannot but think the plaintiff is
entitled to a divorce on the ground of inhuman treatment endangering her life." It is difficult, to define what constitutes cruelty
in the legal sense, but mere rudeness of language, petulance of manner, austerity of temper, or even occasional sallies of passion,
if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not constitute legal cruelty.
These are high moral offences against the marriage relation, but
they do not constitute that cruelty against which the law can
relieve: -vans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Const. 85; Will. Eq. 661. In
the case under consideration both the plaintiff and defendant
appear-occasionally, at least-to use profane and improper language, and both seem to give way to occasional sallies of temper;
but, in our opinion, the evidence fails to establish cruelty. It is
unnecessary to review the evidence at length, nor would it subserve any good purpose to do so. There seems to be nothing to
prevent the parties from living together again as husband and
VOL. X.,XXL-81
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wife if each will exercise a reasonable degree of forbearance
towards each other.
There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.
It is difficult if not impossible to define
cruelty such as authorizes the granting
of a divorce. 11r. Bishop, after having
made the subject a study for over thirty
years-having examined all the decisions and authorities on this subject in
the English language-defines it as
"such conduct in one of the married
parties as, to the reasonable apprehension of the other or, in fact, renders
cohabitation unsafe to a degree justifying
a withdrawal therefrom."
This definition is imperfect in the part italicised.
This part of it turns us over to the
decisions to ascertain the "degree justifying a withdrawal" from cohabitation ;
and does not of itself furnish a true
criterion by which it may be known in
what cruelty consists. In fact, Mr.
Bishop has grounded on the rock that
other legal luminaries have studiously
sought to avoid.
As early as 1790, in Evans v. Evans,
1 Hagg. Con. - 35, 4 Eng. Ec. 310,
what constituted cruelty was much discussed by Lord STowEL.; but no
definition was given by him, and only
statements were made that certain acts
did not constitute cruelty within the
meaning of the law. This negative
method of defining cruelty has been the
one followed by the courts quite generally.
In Evans v. Evans the court declares,
in almost the same language used in the
principal case, that "mere austerity of
temper, petulance of manners, rudeness
of language, a want of civil attention
and accommodation, even occasional
sallies of passion, if they do not threaten
bodily harm, do not amount to legal
cruelty; they are high, moral offences in
the marriage state undoubtedly, not
innocent surely in any other state of
life, but still they are not that cruelty
against which the law can relieve.

Under such misconduct of either of the
parties, for it may exist on one side as
well as on the other, the suffering party
must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection ;
must subdue by decent resistance or by
prudent conciliation ; and, if this cannot
be done, both must suffer in silence."
Another eminent authority considered
the substance of the doctrine laid down
in the case quoted from to be that
"there must be either actual violence
committed, attended with danger t6 life,
limb or health, or there must be a
reasonable apprehension of such violence:" Lockwood v. Lock-wood, 2 Curt.
Ec. 281; 7 Eng. Ec. 114. In another
case it was said: "It will be for you,
on a consideration of the evidence you
have heard, to determine whether the
husband has so treated his wife, and
so manifested his feelings towards her,
as to have inflicted bodily injury, to
have caused reasonable apprehension of
bodily suffering or to have injured
health."
In a New Hampshire case it was
said : "In the judgment of law, any
wilful misconduct of the husband which
endangers the life or health of the wife,
which exposes her to bodily hazard and
intolerable hardship and renders cohabitation unsafe is extreme cruelty.
And in order to amount to such cruelty,
it is not necessary that there should be
many acts. Whenever force and violence, preceded by deliberate insult and
abuse, have been once wantonly and
without provocation used, the wife can
hardly be considered safe:" Poor v.
Poor, 8 N. H. 307. But the language
thus quoted is considerably stronger than
that usually employed.
In a Wisconsin case, after quoting
from the case of Evans v. Evans
Dixox, 0. J., said : " It would seem
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from these remarks by one whose words
ought to be law on this subject, that
there are cases where what merely
wounds the mental feelings, though
unaccompanied with bodily injury,
either actual or menaced, will constitute that cruelty for which the law
will afford relief. It would seem from
the same remarks, also, that proof of
actual bodily injury is not required, but
that such injury, threatened or menaced,
will, under some circumstances suffice.
And it appears to me, in reason and
justice, that both propositions ought to
be accepted as correct.
Everybody
knows that there may be a refinement
of cruelty Dracticed on the part of one
of the parties towards the other, unconnected with gross and abusive language
or epithets, or with anything personally
violent or threatening, which may render
the marriage state absolutely intolerable,
and the discharge of the duties of married life an impossibility. Everybody
knows that the conduct of the husband
towards the" wife may be such, even
without any personal violence, actual or
threatened, as to render her marriage
state intolerable, and, from mere mental
suffering and physical debility so produced, to make it utterly impossible for
her to perform the duties which are
expected of a wife, and which otherwise
she would be able and anxious to perform. The language of the above quotation would seem to leave cases of this
nature within the rule or definition of
legal cruelty, as, I must say, I think
they ought to be; and it is for that
reason I have always doubted the correctness of the decision in the early
case in this court, of Johnson v. Johnson,
4 Wis. 135." In this state the law
allowed a divorce for cruel and inhuman
treatment, "whether practised by using
personal violence or by any other means :"
Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235. See
Beyer v. Beyer, 50 Wis. 254 ; s.a. 36
Am. Rep. 848.
In California, under an early statute,

divorces were granted for extreme
cruelty ; and this term was construed to
mean the same thing as the saevitia of
the English Ecclesiastical Courts; and
the offence was defined "to be any conduct, in one of the married parties,
which furnishes reasonable apprehension
that the continuance of the cohabitation
would be attended with bodily harm to
the other:" Morris v. M'orris, 14 Cal.
76. See Mahone v. Mahone, 19 Cal.
626; Wand v. Wand, 14 Id. 512;
Hughes v. Hughes, 44 Ala. 698.
In a New York case it is said that
there must be in all cases ill treatment
and personal injury, or a reasonable apprehension of personal injury. Words
of menace, accompanied by a probability of bodily violence, are sufficient:
Davies v. Davies, 55 Barb. 130; s. c. 37
How. Pr. 45. This statement is wellsustained by the authorities: Whispell
v. Whispell, 4 Barb. 217; -ard v.
Ward, 103 fI1. 477; Batts v. Batts, 11
Ill. App. 366; Scoggins v. Scoggins, 85
N. C. 347; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 60
How. Pr. 151 ; s. c. 73 N. Y. 369
Smnith v. Smith, 33 N. J. Eq. 458;
WVheeler v. Wheeler, 53 Iowa 511;
s. c. 36 Am. Rep. 240 ; Beyer
v. Beyer, 50 Wis. 254; s. c. 36 Am.
Rep. 848; Buckman v. .uckman, 58
How. Pr. 278 ; Johns v. Johns, 57
Miss. 530; Black v. Black, 30 N. J.
Eq. 215; Henderson v. Henderson, 88
Ill. 248.
While these cases hold that actual
blows need not have been administered
to warrant a divorce, but that the
threats of personal or bodily violence may
have been such as to warrant the court
in finding that a further continuance of
cohabitation would in fact be very likely
to subject the complaining party to a
realization of the threats made by the
guilty party, and the inflicting of bodily
harm; there are cases that very much
incline to the view that other acts,
threats and accusations, which do not
directly tend to bodily harm, are still
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sufficient to authorize the granting of a
divorce.
In a Virginia case it was said that
there may be angry words, coarse and
abusive language, humiliating insults,
and annoyances in all the forms that
malice can suggest, which may as effectually eirdanger life or health, as personal violence, and which, therefore,
would afford grounds of relief by the
court; but what merely wounds the
feelings, without being accompanied by
bodily injury or actual menace, does not
amount to legal cruelty: Latham v.
Latham, 30 Gratt. (Va.) 307.
The last clause of the preceding statement is the doctrine of the principal
case, and is supported by authority:
Pidgev. -Pdge,3 Met. 257 ; Chestnutt v.
Chestnutt, I Spin'ks 196 ; Close v. Close,
9 C. E. Green 338; s. c. 10 Id. 526;
Faller v. Paller, 10 Neb. 144.
Still, the use of language may be
such, in connection with other acts, and
possibly alone, as to entitle the complaining party to a divorce.
It was said in a Pennsylvania case:
"A husband may, by a course of
humiliating insults and annoyances,
practiced in the various forms which
ingenious malice could readily devise,
eventually destroy the life or health of
his wife, although such, conduct may
be unaccompanied by violence, positive or threatened ; would the wife
have no remedy, in such circumstances, under our divorce laws,
because uctual or threatened personal
violence formed no element in such
cruelty? The answer to this question
seems free from difficulty when the subject is considered with reference to the
principles on which the divorce for
cruelty is predicated. The courts intervene to dissolve the marriage bond
under this head, for the conservation of
the life or health of the wife, endangered
by the treatment of the husband. The
cruelty is judged from its effects; not
solely from the means by which those

effects are produced. To hold absolutely, that, if a husband avoids positive
or threatened personal violence, the wife
has no legal protection against any
means short of these, which he may
resort to, and which may destroy-her
life or health, is to invite such a system
of infliction by the indemnity given to
the wrongdoer. The more rational application of the doctrine of cruelty is, to
consider a course of marital unkindness
with reference to the effect it must necessarily produce on the life or health of
the wife ; and if it has such as to effect
or injure either, to regard it as true
legal cruelty. This doctrine seems to
have been in the view of Sir H. J~rnen
FUST,in Dysart v. Dysart, 11 Jur. 490,
492, where he deduces from what Sir
WzILIAM SCOTT ruled in Evans v. Evann, 1 Hagg. Con. 85 ; 4 Eng. Ec. 310,
311, that, 'if austerity of temper, petulance of manner, rudeness of language,
a want of civil attention, occasional sallies of passion, do threaten bodily harm,
they amount to legal cruelty.' This
idea, expressed axiomatically, would be
no'less than an assertion of principle-that, whatever form marital ill-treatment
assumes, if a continuity of it involves
the life or health of the wife, it is legal
cruelty :" Butler v. Butler, 1 Pars.
329. Approved in Powelson v. Powelson, 22 Cal. 358. See Rice v. Rice, 6
Ind. 100.
The language quoted is decidedly in
advance of the doctrine of the principal
case, although the facts in that case do
not appear to have called for an expression on this point ; the conduct of the
defendant does not seem to have endangered or affected the health of the
plaintiff.
It will be observed that the court, in
the Pennsylvania case, held that if the
conduct of the husband is such as to
affect the life or health of the wife, a
divorce may be granted; but it does not
exactly say what is meant by affecting
the life of the wife.
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An English case possibly furnishes a
partial solution of this question. A
wife sued her husband, who was a
clergyman, for a judicial separation on
the ground of cruelty. It was not pretended that any sort of physical injury
had been inflicted; but a constant and
severe course of what the husband
deemed to be affectionate discipline, of
a moral sort, in connection with an
assertion of extreme right of command and control, had impaired her
health, rendering it necessary for her
physical well-being to be separated from
him. The court said: " Without disparaging the just and paramount authority of a husband, it may be safely
asserted that a wife is not a domestic
slave, to be driven at all cost, short of
personal violence, into a compliance with
her husband's demands. And if force,
whether physical or moral, is systematically exerted for this purpose, in such a
manner, to such a degree and- during
such a length of time as to break down
her health and render serious malady
imminent, the interference of the law
cannot be justly withheld by any court
which affects to have charge of the wife's
On appeal it was
persbnal safety."
said in this case: "The most frequent
form of ill-usage which amounts to
cruelty is that of personal violence, but
the courts have never limited their
jurisdiction to such cases alone. * * *
We think the judgment appealed against
is in conformity with the law as previously laid down:" Kelly v. Kelly, L.
R., 2 P. & M. 31 ; on Appeal, p. 59.
Similar language was used in an
American case of earlier date: Bailey
v. Bailey, 97 Mass. 37.3. See Lyster v.
Lyster, Ill Mass. 327.
Some cases of a more recent date, on
this point, may be here noted. Thus
recently in a Kentucky case it was held,
to obtain a divorce on the ground of
cruelty of the husband, his treatment
of his wife must be so cruel and inhuman
as to permanently destroy her peace and

happiness, or such as to indicate a settled aversion to her: Beale v. Beale, 80
Ky. 675. See the earlier case, where
a different view is entertained : YT/ornberry v. Thornberry, 2 J. J. Mar. 322.
Mr. Bishop states that "A groundless and malicious charge by a husband
against his wife's chastity, or of incest,
though not ordinarily deemed quite
sufficient, standing completely alone, is,
when the foundation for its admission is
so laid, deemed a gross act of cruelty,
almost enough of itself: " 1 Bish. far.
& Div., sect. 726. The author very
much inclines to the view that such a
charge, if carried beyond his own
dwelling, is sufficient to entitle her to
a divorce.
Since this author's edition of this work
for 1881 was issued, a number of decisions have been rendered on this
subject. Thus, in Oregon, a false accusation of unchastity was held a sufficient cause for a divorce: Smith v.
Smith, 8 Oregon 100.
In a New York case it was held to be
"cruel and inhuman treatment" for a
husband to wantonly and maliciously
charge his wife with unchastity and
infidelity to her marriage vows. The
charges were uttered frequently, and
these alone, it was said, would entitle
the wife to a divorce. It is to be
observed that the husband's conduct was
very violent, and of itself sbfficient to
authorize the granting of a divorce:
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 60 How. Pr. 151 ;
s. e. 47 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 56. While
this case was affirmed on appeal, it was
expressly said that, " If a husband has
reason to suspect his wife of infidelity,
it is neither cruel nor inhuman to charge
her with it, although personal violence
is not justifiable: " Kennedy v. Kennedy, 73 N. Y. 369.
When the accusation is publicly
made, either in the presence or out of
the presence of the wife, the charge is
considered of a much graver character
than when privately made. In an
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Indiana case it was recently said:
" ' Cruel I is defined to mean, to give
pain, willing br pleased to give torment, vex or afflict, or cause grief or
misery. I Inhuman ' is defined to mean,
destitute of the kindness and tenderness
that belongs to a human being. A husband could hardly, by any other means,
cause a sensitive wife more mental
pain, torment, vexation, affliction, grief
and misery, than to, falsely charge her
with the crime of adultery, and slanderously report the same around among her
neighbors; and in doing so he would
certainly be guilty of a great unkindness and want of tenderness towards
her. A greater violation of the marital
vow, to protect and defend the reputation, as well as the person, of a wife,
the husband could not commit, than to
wantonly traduce and vilify her character:" Graft v. Graft, 76 Ind. 136.
This case was afterwards expressly
approved, and the definition of Mr.
Bishop said to be good as far as it goes,
but it did not include every species of
"cruel and inhuman treatment:"
Eastes v. Eastes, 79 Ind. 363, 371. To
the same effect was said to be Shores v.
Shores, 23 Ind. 546.
So in Michigan it was held, that a
husband was entitled to a divorce for
extreme cruelty, where his wife, without
cause, had constantly and publicly
charged him with unfaithfulness, disgracing him and endangering his means
of livelihood: Witmore v. Witmore,
49 Mich. 417. So accusing a wife of
communicating to him a venereal disease, is a good cause for a divorce:
AfcMahan v. Mcahan, 9 Oregon 525.
A charge of adultery made in the presence of a visitor and the servants of the
family, was held sufficient to authorize a
divorce for public defamation within the
meaning of the Louisiana code: Cass
v. Cass, 34 La. Ann. 611.
So it is extreme cruelty to a wife for
her husband openly to consort with and

express his preference for females : 21cClung v. UcClung, 40 Mich. 493.

Adultery of itself is not cruelty:
Haskell v. Haskell, 54 Ca]. 262.
These cases are of themselves enough
to show the general drift of the courts.
In this they are following what Mr.
Bishop deems in principle should be the
law.
We proceed to notice, categorically,
the remaining cases on the subject of
cruelty.
Excessive sexual intercourse is ground
of divorce, and the fact may be shown
by the wife's testimony; which, in
such a case, is not excluded on grounds
of public policy: Melvin v. Melvin, 58
N. H. 569; s.c. 42 Am. Rep. 605.
On a libel for divorce against the
husband, evidence of his familiarities
and attentions to his half-sister, and
refusal to send her away when requested
by the wife, together with neglect of the
wife's comfort, was held not to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment and
personal indignities, rendering life
burdensome, within the Oregon statute:
Rickardv. Rickard, 9 Oregon 168.
Where a husband, in spite of his
wife's remonstrance, supports in the
house persons who so treat her as to
justify on her part apprehension of personal violence, he is respons ble for
their acts as if they were his own, and
she is entitled to a divorce for "cruel
and inhuman treatment, and personal
indignities rendering life burdensome :"
Hall v. Ball, 9 Oregon 452.
A wife went to her parent's house to
be confined, against the objection of her
husband, with whose parents they had
been living. When he received word
that she was confined, he did not, at
first, go to see her, and when he did go,
in reply to a reproachful letter from her,
he told her he had received a letter
from her full of lies, and had come to
warn her that if she was not back
before the issue of the next week's
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paper, he should advertise her. He
also intimated that the child was begotten by her father. This was held
to be a case of extreme and wanton
cruelty, entitling the wife to a divorce:
Palmerv. Palmer, 45 Mich. 150; s. c.
40 Am. Rep. 461.
Where the cruelty complained of was
the result of the husband's insanity, it
was*held that a wife is equally entitled
to protection against extreme cruelty
on the part of her husband, where his
malevolence is the result of insane
delusion, as where it springs from jealousy or hatred: Smith v. Smith, 33 N.
J. Eq. 458.
A husband having intercourse with
his wife when it is extremely probable
that lie is infected with venereal disease, and communicating it to his wife,
is guilty, in New Jersey, of extreme
cruelty, entitling her to a divorce:
Cook v. Cook, 32 N. J. Eq. 475.
In Maryland a single act of personal
violence of the husband to the wife
does not constitute "cruelty of treatment" within the statute:
oshall v.
Hoshall, 51 Md. 72 ; s. c. 34 Am.
Rep. 298.
Where a wife's conduct, induced
mainly by the fact that she was unwilling to live with her mother-in-law,
was exasperating and unforgiving,
provoking her husband even to violence
in a single instance, and under peculiar
circumstances, and exhibited an entire disregard of his wishes about his
household affairs, and a determination
not to do her duty therein, it was held
not to be sufficient ground to sustain a
divorce for cruelty, although presenting
no justification for such violence: Coles
v. Coles, 32 N. J. Eq. 547.
Insulting and degrading language
used by a husband to his wife is not
ground, in Alabama, for a divorce ;
but in case of actual cruelty such language may be shown in aggravation:
Folmar v. Folmar, 69 Ala. 84.
So misunderstandings and difficulties

between husband and wife, attributable
to a want of proper control of temper on
both sides, afford no foundation fbr a
divorce: Castanedo v. Fortier, 34 La.
Ann. 135.
So ill-treatrfent soon after marriage,
if followed by a peaceable, and on the
whole harmonious, life for many years,
can be given little weight in a suit for
a divorce on account of cruelty : Rayner
v. -?ayner, 49 Mich. 600.
A continual succession of petty annoyances, complaints, fault-finding and disparagement of his common sense, taste
and judgment, do not constitute such
extreme cruelty as will justify granting
a husband a divorce from his wife:
Beller v. Beller, 49 Mich. 639.
Where drunkenness and cruelty are
alleged as a cause for a divorce, the
position in life and degree of refinement
of the parties may be properly considered, where the circumstances demand it: Kline v. Kline, 50 Mich.
438.
In a recent Indiana case the husband
abandoned the wife and her infant
child, without cause, absconded from
the state to some distant, and to her
unknown, state or territory, and without any explanation, excuse or correspondence with her, left her dependent
upon herself and her friends for the support of herself and her child. From the
time of the desertion to the commencement of the suit the husband had not
provided any means of support for the
wife or child ; and during that time the
wife had been seriously ill and greatly
in need of assistance, and of the society,
nursing and comfort of her husband.
It was held that this constituted "cruel
and inhuman treatment" of the wife by
the husband.
After referring to the statement, as
made above, the court said: "It may
well be said, as it seems to us, that his
'treatment'
of her was sufficiently
cruel,' within the meaning of the statute, to entitle her to a decree of divorce.
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If a sensitive, spirited woman, such
treatment would be far more cruel and
inhuman than the infiction of corporal
punishment, or of severe injuries to her
person; for mental suffering and public

shame and disgrace are more difficult to
be borne than mere physical pain :"
Eastes v. Eastes, 79 Ind. 363, 373.
W. W. THORNTON.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Superior Court of Cincinnati.
HOFFMAN v. BROOKS.
A pooling agreement made by all the tobacco warehousemen of a large city,
fixing prices for tobacco and rates for service, restricting the freedom of the parties to it, and providing for the forfeiture of sums belonging to the parties for
breaches of it, is void, and penalties for such breaches cannot be recovered.

i-oadly, Johnson & Colston, Long, Kramer & Kramer, attorneys for plaintiffs.
. A. Ferguson and McDougall & Longworth, attorneys for
defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-It appears by the pleadings, the case being
reserved upon demurrer to the reply, that in June 1881, the
owners of all the warehouses in this city for the storage and sale
at public auction of -leaf tobacco,* six in number, of which defendants owned one, entered into a written agreement, whose. object,
according to its preamble, was to promote and protect the trade
and harmonize the conflicting interests of all engaged in it in
Cincinnati. It adopted a plan for pooling a portion of the
receipts of the business, the president and secretary of the "association," as they styled themselves, being named as pool trustees.
It was. mad. the duty of the owners of each warehouse to make to
'such trustees, at the first of each mont, a sworn statement of the
number of hogsheads, casks and boxes of tobacco received
therein during the month preceding, and to give to such trustees
certificates of indebtedness, at the rate of $3 per hogshead and $1
for smaller packages. At the end of the year the funds so raised
were to be divided as follows: An amount supposed to be the
amount of business ordinarily done per year by each warehouse,
was fixed for the first year, and a method adopted for fixing such
amount for other years, and it was to be credited upon its certifiHARMON,
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cates for that amount at the rate so paid in. After deducting 10
per cent., to be left in the hands of the trustees or their successors
as a guarantee fund, the remainder was to be equally divided. ,
The guarantee fund was to be under the control of two-thirds of
the warehouses, except in cases of death, assignment or withdrawal
from business. No warehouse could withdraw without unanimous
consent, and any violation of the agreement was to forfeit all
interest in such fund. Each was to pay into the pool $5 for every
hogshead it might fall short of the amount of business so fixed as
the amount of its credit.
The agreement was to go into effect December 1st 1881. On
November 25th, however, the parties by another writing entered
into what they styled "Articles of agreement of the Cincinnati
Tobacco Warehouse Association." The association was made to
consist of "one member of each firm engaged in the sale of leaf
tobacco in this city." The articles provided for the usual officers
and specified their duties; required two stated meetings each
month, and permitted call meetings besides; provided fines for
every failure to attend and for every violation of the articles.
They then stipulated that no rebate or presents should be given
to customers, except in a single district and to a limited amount;
that no agents should be employed except in certain districts; that
no effort should be made to change the consignment of any tobacco
en route to any of the members, &c.
They then proceeded to fix the rates to be charged for drayage,
storage, inspection, insurance, selling, interest on advances, and
everything connected with the business down to the price of empty
hogsheads; and in addition to the security of the guarantee fund
and the power to impose fines as high as $500, the articles provide the association with inquisitorial power over the employees of
all the warehouses and all other persons.
Defendants furnished their sworn statement, and gave their
certificates of indebtedness at the first of each month up to August
1882, when they refused to do so longer. Plaintiffs, who are the
pool trustees, sue upon the seven certificates of indebtedness so
given, and also for an account of the business done by defendants
during the remaining five months, and for the amount so found due
the pool under said agreement.
The right of plaintiffs to sue upon this last cause of action is
open to grave doubt, but the right to sue upon the certificates is
VOL. XXI.-82
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Their right to recover upon them depends upon

the question whother the agreement above set forth is valid or not.
We say agreement, because while plaintiffs set out only the first
writing in their petition, and deny in their reply that the second,
which defendants set out in their answer, and allege to have been
executed before the other was in fact so executed, the two writings
are undoubtedly parts of the same plan. The second in date
purports on its face to be "made co-operative with and for the
purpose of carrying out" the first, and the first refers to an "association," though none appears to have been formally organized
until it was done by the second. Although it is alleged in the
answer and denied by the reply that the object, intention and
effect of the agreement were to establish and maintain high rates
of interest and charges, and to restrain the several parties thereto
from carrying on their business according to their own discretion,
to stifle competition and create a perpetual monopoly, we think
these are questions of construction, not of allegation and proof,
otherwise than by the terms of the agreement itself: Kellogg v.
Larkin, 3 Chand. 133, and the circumstances under which it was
made.

It is not necessary to review the many authorities cited by
counsel. The principles of law are settled with reasonable certainty. The difficulty arises in their application to the varying
character presented by contracts.
The cases upon this subject seem to naturally separate into two
classes.
In one the question is whether the contracting party has to a
greater extent than fairly required for the protection of his private
interests, disabled himself from carrying on his trade or business,
and so not only deprived society of a useful member, but created a
strong probability of adding to its burdens by reason of idleness or
crime. The public in this class of cases is affected only indirectly
through the individual contracting. See Lange v. TJerk, 2 Ohio
St. 519; Thomas v. Wiley, 3 Id. 225, and cases cited in note to
Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas.
In the other class the question arising upon agreements creating
combinations of persons engaged or interested in the same kind of
business is, whether their object and effect are to directly affect the
public "by preventing competition and enhancing prices," or "by
exposing it to the evils of monopoly :" Alger v. Thacker, 19 Pick.
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51. The law, as well said by JESSEL, M. R., in Printing Co. v.
Lamson, L. R., 19 Eq. 465, will not lightly interfere with the
citizen's liberty to contract as he will, but the interests of the
public have led to unquestionable limitations of such liberty.
In the first class of cases just named the interests of the public
and those of the party are to a great extent the same. Both forbid any restriction of his earning power without an equivalent, and
this is the reason why only a partial restriction is permitted, and
that only for a valuable consideration.
In the second class of cases the immediate interests of the public
and those of the contracting parties are in conflict. The former
desire lower, the latter higher prices. Any prevention of competition injures the public in this regard. _But when competition
becomes so great that those engaged in a business cannot carry it
on without loss, the public becomes exposed to the same danger as
in the first class. The law, therefore, applies an analogous rule.
Those engaged in any trade or business may, to such limited
extent as may be fairly necessary to protect their interests, enter
into agreements which will result in diminishing competition and so
increasing prices. Just the extent to which this may be done
courts have been careful not to define, just as they have refused to
set monuments along the line between fairness and fraud.
The presumption is always against the validity of such agreements, and certainly where they include all those engaged in any
business in a large city or district, are unlimited in duration, and
are manifestly intended, by the surrender of individual discretion,
by the arbitrary fixing pf prices, or by any of the methods to which
the hope of. gain makes human ingenuity so fruitful, to strangle
competition outright and breed monopolies, the law, while it may
not punish, will not enforce them: Salt Co. v. GCuthrie, 85 Ohio
St. 666; Grosselli v. Louden, 11 Id. 349; Crawford v. Wick,
18 Id. 190; ZoBirnie v. White Lead Co., 9 W. L. B. 310 ;
Coal Co. v. Same, 68 Penn. St. 173; Arnot v. Coal Co., 68 N.
Y. 558; Croft v. JfcOonoghy, 79 Ill. 346; Hilton v. _ckeersley, 6
E. & B. 47; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 484.
And we notice in the newspapers of April 25th, a brief notice of
a decision by the Superior Court of Indianapolis refusing to enforce
an agreement among insurance companies fixing rates, &c. Although, as said in 1?aymond v. Leavitt, 46 Mich. 447, courts may
be inclined to apply this rule more strictly in cases involving the
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necessaries of life or services of a quasi public nature, there is no
authority for excepting from its operations any legitimate trade or
business : Alger v. Thacker, supra.
Judged by this rule we think the agreement upon which this
action is based must be condemned. Parts of it are perhaps not
objectionable, such as those providing against the employment of
agents, the payment of bounties, attempts to change consignments,
and for notice to each other of advancements to common customers,
&c. But by its terms it purports, and by its pleadings is admitted to
embrace all the persons engaged in a business shown by the pleadings
to be of very great magnitude in a city admitted to be the largest'
market for such business in the United States. It is unlimited in
duration, and manifestly intended to be perpetual. None can
withdraw without unanimous consent, and the guaranty fund is
artfully contrived to operate as a constantly strengthening chain
to hold the association together. It is not averred that the prices
fixed are extortionate, but it is enough that they are absolutely
removed beyond the operations of every natural cause of fluctuation.
Though fixed at first for only a year, there is no telling how they
might be fixed in succeeding years when the guaranty fund becomes
sufficient of itself to force obedience to the mandates of the managers.
In short, either this rule does not apply to persons engaged in
this business at all, or this contract violates it. It is hard to
imagine how it could go further than it does. Nor is it one of
those agreements in which, for the purposes of our judgment here, •
the good can be separated from the bad. Judgment for plaintiffs
would merely place money in the fund which is held as a guaranty
for compliance with all and singular the stipulations of the agreement. We are not asked nor have we power to control its application. We are requested to confer a sceptre to be wielded by an
absolute monarch.
The cases upon which plaintiffs rely do not conflict with our
decision. Skrainka v. Scharringhauser, 8 Mo. App. 522, is
expressly put upon the ground that the agreement was reasonable,
being limited to six months aiid to a part only of a city, and it
affirmatively appearing that competition was so great as to entail
actual loss upon all engaged in the business, which does not appear
here. And the court remarks very truly that while the evils to be
apprehended from contracts by individuals not to engage in busi-
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ness have diminished with the development of civilization, those to
be feared from combinations of wealth and power have increased :
Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Chand. 133, is decided upon the same
ground.
In Collins v. Locke, L. R., 4 App. Ca. 674, the part of the
agreement held valid went to no such length as this. It was merely
an agreement among persons engaged in stevedoring to assign to
each the business of certain shipping-houses, whether it included
all the stevedoring firms in the place, and whether it was limited
in time, do not very plainly appear. These, however, were not
to be taken as absolute tests. But, although the court says
one of the results of the agreement would probably be to raise or
keep up prices, there was no attempt to fix or regulate them.
Each was left to bargain for himself. Though not expressly stated
in the report, this is clearly shown by the, stipulation for arbitration of the amount to be paid in case any one should be called to
work for the customer of another.
The distinction between the other cases cited for plaintiffs and
this are too manifest to require mention. We need not notice the
other questions raised.
Demurrer sustained and judgment for defendant.
All concur.
DUTY OF COURTS TO REGARD rUBLIC INTEREST.-" It is the duty of all

courts of justice to keep their eye
steadily upon the interests of the public,
even in the administration .of commutative justice, and when they find an
action is founded upon a claim injurious
to the public, and which has a bad
tendency, to give no countenance or
assistance inforo civili:" Wilmot's Opinions 377, quoted in Crawford v. Wick,
18 Ohio St. 190, 204. "Though the
branch of the law relating to public
policy," says another judge, "is liable
to be misunderstood andextended beyond
its proper dimensions, still it must not
on that account be neglected or disparaged. The rule that contracts and agreements are void when contrary to public
policy, when properly understood and
applied, is one of the great preservative

principles of a state. Sound morality is
the cornerstone of the social edifice.
Whatever disturbs that is condemned
under that fundamental rule:" Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 434,
(1849).
"The immediate representatives of
the people in the legislature assembled,"
says Howe, J., of Wisconsin, "would
seem to be the fairest exponents of
what public policy requires, as being
most familiar with the habits and fashions of the day, and with the actual
condition of commerce and trade, their
consequent wants and weaknesses. Legislation is the least objectionable because
it operates prospectively as a guide to
future negotiations, and does not like a
judgment of a court annul a contract
already concluded in good faith and
upon a valuable consideration, and es-
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tablishes a rule given a wider circulation
among the people, and which enters
more generally into the information of
the public. But this consideration by
no means establishes the impropriety of
a judicial determination that transactions are ' at war with any established
interest of society however individuals
may suffer thereby.' The interest of
individuals must be subservient to the
public welfare :" Kdlogg v. Larkin, 3
Pinney (Wis.) 123; s. c. 3 Chand.
153, 56 Am. Dec. 164.
ALL CONTRtACTS OPPOSED TO PUBLIC
POLICY voiD.-We may take it as well
settled that, in the law of contracts,
"the first purpose of the courts is to
look to the welfare of the public, and if
the enforcement of the agreement would
be inimical to its interests no relief
could be granted to the party injured,
and even though it might result beneficially to the party who made and
"No, prinviolated the agreement."
ciple of law is better settled than that
no action will lie to enforce a contract
made in violation of a statute or of the
common law, or which is immoral in
its character and against public policy."
Per GREEN, J., in Hale v. Henderson,
4 Humph. (Tenn.) 199 (1883) : "The
common law will not permit individuals
to oblige themselves by a contract either
io do or not to do anything, when the
thing to be done or omitted is in any
degree clearly injurious to the public."
Per GREEN, J., in West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line
Co., 22 W. Va. 600 (1883): "Whatever is injurious to the interest of the
public," says Chief Justice TIxDALL,

"Iis void on the ground of public policy :"
Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735 (1831).
"The law question involved in this
cause," said GREEx, J., in a late West
"Virginia case, "is, whether when two
parties enter into a contract, the purpose
and effect of which is that something by
the terms of the contract is to be done
which is contrary to public policy or is

fraudulent, and both of the parties to
such contract are equally guilty, will a
court, either of law or of equity, enforce
such contract? An examination of
the authorities shows that the proper
answer to this question is, that as a
general rule, neither a court of law nor
of equity will enforce such fraudulent or
vicious contract. The maxim in pari
delieto potier est conditio defendentis, that
is, when both parties are equally guilty
the defendant shall prevail, is very generally applicable to such a case :" Horn
v. Star Foundry Co., 23 W. Va. 522
(1884).
FoR WHOSE SAKE OBJECTION ENTEETAINED.-It seems to be the notion of
some that the objection of public policy
is entertained out of consideration for
the party making it, and this notion is
strengthened by decisions of the character of that recently rendered by the
Missouri Court of Appeals, to the effect
tht a couit of appeal will not avoid a
contract on the ground of public policy
on its own motion: Havarstickv. Shields,
11 Mo. App. 602 (1883). This logic
does not commend itself to us, for it is
the established doctrine that "relief is
not refused on a breach of such agreements that the party who made and
violated the agreement may escape damages on account of any injustice or
When the court
hardship to him."
"refuses to interfere upon principles of
public policy, it acts with reference to
the interests of the public, and not with
reference to the conduct of individuals:
Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway
Co. v. The London and North-Western
Railway Co., 4 De G., M. & G. 115,
135 (1853), "The court does not give
relief for the sake of the parties who
complain, but for the sake of the public,
and to avoid public injury:" Per Master
of the Rolls, in Simpson v. Lord Howdin,
1 R. Cas. 326, 035 (1837).
MANNER OF WANING OBJECTION IN-

MATERIAL.-It matters not how the
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objection is brought to the attention of
the court. All the court requires is that
it may in some way acquire notice of the
prejudicial purpose of a contract to warrant it in asserting the contract to be invalid. However suchpurposeis exposed,
its perniciousness will destroy itself:
Sampson v. Shaw, 101 Mass. 145, 152
(1869). It is immaterial whether the promissee may establish his right of action
without laying it open to objection; the
objection may come from the promissor,
though a particeps criminis: Blythe v.
Liringood, 2 Ired. (N. C.) Law 20
"The objection," says one
(1841).
court, "may seem to come with a very
bad grace from the defendant, because
he was particeps criminis. It is not for
his sake that it is allowed ; but it is
founded in general principles of policy,
of which he has the advantage contrary
to the real justice as between him and
the plaintiff. No court will lend its
aid to a man who founds his cause of
action upon a promise, the consideration of which is contra bones mores; or
against the public policy, the laws of
the state, or in fraud of the state or
of any third person :" Ingramn v. Ingram, 4 Jones (N. C.) Law 190.
SAME sUBjECT-LORD

MANSFIELD'S

vinw.-Lord MANSFIELD put the doctrine well when he said: "The objection that a contract is immoral or
illegal as between plaintiff and defendant sounds at all times very ill in the
mouth of the defendant. It is not for
his sake, however, that the objection is
even allowed ; but it is founded in general principles of policy which the
defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice as between him
and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may
say so. The principle of pullic policy
is this: ex dole male non oritur actie.
No court will lend its aid to a man who
founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act. If, from the
plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the

action appears to arise, ex turpi causa,
or from transgression of a positive law
of the country, then the court says he
has no right to be assisted. It is upon
this ground the court goes ; not for the
sake of the defendant, but because they
will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff:" Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 343;
quoted with approval in Blythe v. Longwood, 2 Ired. (N. C.) Eq. 20, 21, 22
(181).
COURT NOT JURY TO DECIDE

UPON

REPUGNANCY.-It has been asserted
that thq jury is the proper tribunal for
the settlement of the question, whether
a contract should be denounced as
But Chief
opposed to public policy.
Justice HE% ILL disposes of the claim
in these words: "It seems a new rule
has been discovered by which to test the
validity of contracts; and that is, the
belief of the jury with regard to this
tendency to immorality and breaches of
the peace, and this even where such contracts have been declared by the court
of the last resort to be valid ifflaw,
and to have all the force and efficacy
which the law can impart to any contract. No doctrine more subversive of
law and of private and public rights
could have been devised. In fact, it
sets them afloat in public sentiments, to
fluctuate and rise and fall with the ebb
and flow of popular opinion, and, when
brought to trial, to succeed or fail, not
according to established rules of law, but
upon the belief, the private opinions, or,
in other words, the whims and caprices
of the jury before whom they are presented. The most sacred rights-those
most cherished by the law-may be frustrated and defeated if, without any regard
to the law, a justice of the peace with his
jury might deem them against moral
good order or public policy. * * * It
is the duty of both judges and juries to
decide on rights according to the laws
of the land, and not on their belief of
what ought to be law. Their office is
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not legislative, It is judicial; it is to
administer the law as they find it,
and not to exalt their own belief or
notions above the law, and follow these
as a 'higher code by which the rights of
'the community are to be regulated or
controlled: Pierce v. Randolph, 12
Texas 290.
REPUGNANCY TO PUBLIC POLICY
MUST BE CLEAR.-But I the power of

1884) : "To hold a contract void on the
ground of its impoliey or inconvenience,
we ought to be clearly satisfied that the
performance of it would be necessarily
attended with injury or inconvenience
to the public." Per Chief Justice TINDALL,

in

Walsh v. Fuseell, 3 Mo. P.

457; s. c. 6 Bing. 163: "An agreement is not void on this ground unless
it expressly and unquestionably contravenes public policy, and is manifestly
injurious to the interests of the state :"
Chitty on Contracts 664.

the courts to declare a contract void for
being in contravention of sound public
policy, is a very delicate and undefined
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO
'power, and like the power to declare
a statute unconstitutional should be exer- RESTRAINT OF TIL&DE.-The doctrine
of public policy has been applied with
cised only in cases free from doubt."
Per COLE, J., in Richmond v. Dubuque greater strictness, perhaps, to the docand Sioux Cityr Railroad Co., 26 Iowa trine of restraints of trade than to any
191, 202 (1868) : "Before a. court other class of contracts. The old maxim
should determine a transaction which at the foundation of the doctrine which
has been entered into in good faith, denounces contracts restraining the libstipulating for nothing that is malum erty of the parties making them to
in se to be void as contravening the trade is, "competition is the life of
Among those who do little
policy of the state, it should be satis- trade."
fied.
that the advantage to acciue to the thinking themselves, this maxim is bepublic for so holding is certain and sub- lieved to be infallible. Judge How,
stantial, not theoretical or problematical. of Wisconsin, has, however, characterHe is the safest magistrate who is more ized it as one of the most unreliable "of
watchful over the rights of the indi- the host that may be picked up in anyvidual than qver the convenience of the market place:" Kellogg v. Larkin, 3
public, as that is the best government Pinney (Wis.) 123 (1881); S. 0. 56
which guards more vigilantly the free. Am. Dec. 164.
ITS oRGoIN.-As said by the Supreme
dom of the subject than the rights of
the state:" Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pinney Court of California: "At an early pe(Wis.) 123 (1851); s. o. 3 Chandler riod in English jurisprudence when trade
and the mechanical acts were in their
133; 56 Am. Dec. 164. CALDWELL,
J., said very recently: "No court infancy, it was deemed a matter of the
ought to refuse its aid to enforce a con- greatest public importance to encourage
tract on doubtful and uncertain grounds. their growth and to prohibit contracts
The burden is on the defendant to show which tended to abridge them. Hence,
that its enforcement would be in viola- the rule first established was that all
tion of the settled public policy of this contracts were void, which, in any destate, or injurious to the morals of the gree tended to the restraint of trade
people. Vague surmises and flippant even in a particular circumscribed loassertions as to what is the public cality, either for a definite or limited
policy of the state, or what would be period :" Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal. 357
shocking to the moral sense of its peo- (1868).
ple arc not indulged in." Swaim v.
GENERAL RESTRAINTS ON TRADE,
Swaim, U. S. C. C., E. D. Ark. (Aug. WHAT vow.-This rule has, however,
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long been cast aside, the doctrine now
being that, generally, all such covenants
as restrain the business or industrial
freedom of the covenantor universally:
Thomas v. Mfiles, 3 Ohio St. 276 (1854) ;
Hedge v. Lowe, 47 Iowa 137 (1877);

Mossop v. Mason, 18 Gr. Ch. (Out.)
453 (1871) ; s. c. 17 Id. 360 (1870) ;
s. c. 16 Id. 302 (1869) ; Kennedy v.
Lee, 3 Mer. 440, 451, 452 (1817)
Lange v. lVerk, 2 Ohio St. 519 (1853);
Hinde v. Gray, 1 1. & G. 195 (1840);
s. c. 1 Scott N. R. 123; 4 Jur. 392;
Curtis v. Gokey, 68 N. Y. 300 (1877)
s. c. 5 Hun 555 (1875); Saratoga
County Bank v. King, 44 N. Y. 87
(1870) ; Petz v. Eichele, 62 Mo. 171
(1876); Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick.
(Mass.) 51 (1837) ; Callahan v. Donnolly, 45 Cal. 152 (1872) ; .faier v.
Homan, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 168 (1871).
See Casewell v. Gibbs, 33 Mich. 331
(1876); or in a particelar country:
Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519 (1853);
Deanv. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480 (1869) ;
or state: lVright v. Ryder, 36 Cal. 357
(1868). See Oregon Steam Navigation
Co. v. Tinsor, 20 Wall. 67 (1873);
Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen 370;
M3ore v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251 (1870).
Per GREEN, J., in West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line
Co., 22 W. Va. 600, 617 (1883); or
in any considerable portion thereof:
Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641
(1851); Price v. Green, 16 M. & W.
446 (1847) ; s. c. 13 Id. 695 (1845) ;
Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735 (1831);
or on the high seas: Mirray v. Vanderhilt, 39 Barb. 140 (1863) ; whether for
all time or for only a limited period:
Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. (Mass.)
51 (1837) ; Mallan v. May, 11 MI. &
W. 653 ; either absolutely or except on
payment of tribute: Keeler v. Taylor,
53 Pa. St. 467, are void.
GENERAL RESTRAINT WHEN VALID.-

Even this rule is not infallible. The
very covenants denounced by it may be
valid when the interests of the coveVOL. XXXII.-83

nantee require the protection secured by
the restraint, operating by the covenant:
Whdttaker v. Howe, 3 Beav. 383, 396
(1841); Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490
(1873); Rouissillon v. Rouissillon, L. R.,
14 Ch. Div. 351 (1879); s. C.49 L. J.
Ch. (N. S.) 339; 42 L. T. (N. S.) 679;
28 W. R. 623; Ainsworth v. Bentley, 14
W. R. 630; Ingram v. Stiff, 5 Jur. (N.
S.) 947; Presbury v. Fisher, 18 Mo. 50;
Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. lVinsor,
See Wfriqht v.
20 Wall. 67 (1872).
Ryder, 36 Cal. 357 (1868); Callahanv.
Donnolly, 45 Id. 152 (1873) ; or where
it is made to put an end to ruinous competition: Wicken v. Evans, 3 Y. & J.
318 (1829); the only limitation being
that the restraint shall not be larger than
the interests of the party fairly require:
Allsop v. Wheatcroft, 42 L. J. Ch. 12
(1872); -linde v. Gray, 1 M. & G. 195;
s. c. I Scott N. R. 123 ; Wardv. Byrne,
5 M. & W. 548, 559 (1839); 3 Jur.
1175 ; 9 L. J. (N. S.) Exch. 14 ; Oregon Steam Navigation Cb. v. Winsor, 20
Wall. 64(1873). They are likewise valid
when made only to secure to the covenantees the entire benefit of a business
sold to them by the covenantors, to which
such covenants are incidental: Whittaker
v. Howe, 3 Beav. 383, 394 (1841);
Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490; Ainsworth
v. Bentley, 14 W. R. 630; Ingram v.
Stiff, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 947; Presbury v.
llsher, 18 Mo. 50 ; or are incidental to
the sale of a patented invention : Morse
Drilling Co. v. Morse, 103 Mass. 73
(1869); Mackinnon Pen Co. v. Fountain
Ink Co., 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 442 (1882);
or trademark: Callahan v. Donnolly, 45
Cal. 152 (1872); see Gillis v. Ball, 2
Brewster (Pa.)342 (1870); s. c. 7 Phila.
422; Brewer v. Lamar, 18 Cent. L. J.
54 (1883); or secret process of manufacture or compounding: Bryson v.
Whitehead, 1 Sim. & Stu. 74 (1821);
a. c. 1 L. J. Ch. 42 ; Hagy v. Darley,
47 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. Div. 567 (1878);
s. c. 38 L. T. (N. S.) 312; Jarvis v.
Peck, 10Paige 118 (1843); s. c. IHoff.
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Ch. 479 (1840); Alcock v. Giberton, 5
Duer (N. Y.) 76 (1855); Vickery v.
Wdsh, L. R., 9 Eq. 365 (1868); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) ;
Brewer v. Lamar, 18 Cent. L. J. 54;
Gillis v. Hall, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 342
(1870) ; s. c. 7 Phila. 422 ; 27 Leg. Int.
1870, 302 ; Heard v. Sedey, 47 Barb.
(N. Y.) 428 (1865); or are made to
secure to the parties thereto the fruits of
their joint industry, or to the covenantor some advantage not otherwise obtainable: Stearns v. Barrett, I Pick. (Mass.).
442 (1823); 11 Am. Dec. 223; Jones
v. Lees, 1 H. & N. 189 (1859) ; Billings
I.Ames, 32 Mo. 265 ; so they are not void
when the business is one but lately discovered and likely to fail if not restricted:
Perkins v. Lyman, 9 Mass. 522 (1823);
or when the covenanter provides the covenantee with employment in the business,
to be abstained from during the period
during which the restraint is to operate;
Wallis v. Day, 2 M. & W. 273 (1837);
s. c. I Jur. 73; Kinsman v. I-hrkhurst,
18 How. (U. S.) 289 (1855); Hartley
v. Cummings, 5 C. B. 246 (1847); s. c.
2C. & K.433;,s.o. 12 Jur. 57; 17 L.
J. C. P. 84; or if such business be
itself condemned by the policy of the
state or nation, at the time the covenants
are made: Harrisonv. Lockhart, 25 Ind.
112 (1865); Dixon v. United States, I
Brock. (Marshall's Dec.) 177 (1811);
so covenants which secure to the covenautees the exclusive custom of the covenantor for all time or for a limited
period only are valid: Palmerv. Stebbins,
.3 Pick. (Mass.) 188 (1825); Thornton
v. Sherratt, 8 Taunt. 529 (1818); Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Camp. 391 (1810);
Brown v. Rounsavell, 78 Ill. 589 (1876);
Gale v. Reed, 8 East 80 (1806); Lightner v. Menzell, 35 Cal. 452 (1868);
whether the covenanter be engaged in
public or private business: Taff Vale
Railroad Co. v. McNabb, 42 L. J. C. L.
153 (1873); 22 W. R. 65; The Wiggins
Perry Co. v.. . 4- A. Railroad Co., 73
Mo. 389 (1881); Richmond v. Dubuque,

etc., Railroad Co., 26 Iowa 191, s. c.
33 Iowa: when they are not prejudicial
to the public: Holcombe v. Hewson, 2
Camp. 391 (1810); and covenants which
bind the covenantors to labor exclusively
for or sell exclusively to one person, are
equally valid: Van Harterv. Babcock, 23
Barb. 633 (1857); Schwan v. Holmes,
49 Cal. 665 1875 ; Long v. Towl, 42
Mo. 545 (1868); Morris v. Colman, 18
Vesey 438 (1811); Stiff v. Cassell, 2
Jar. (N. S.) 348 (1856); Pilkingion v.
Scott, 15 M. & W. 657.
PARTIAL

IIESTRAINTS

OF

TRADE

VALID.-As to partial restraints of trade
it is now clear that all covenants which
restrain the business or industrial freedom of the covenanter with reasonable
limits: Butler v. Bruleson, 16 Vt. 176
(1844); Hayward v. Young, 2 Chitty
407 (1818); Gravely v. Barnard,43 L.
J. Ch. 659; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 863;
Chesman v. Namnby, 1 Bro. P. C. 234
(1727); Bowser v. Bliss, 7 Blackf. Ind.
344 (1845); Elves v. Crofts, 10 C. B.
239 (1850); Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 A.
& E. 438; Clarkson v. Edge, 33 Beav.
227 (1863); Jones v.Heavens, L. R., 4
Ch. Div. 636; Nobles v. Bates, 7 Cow.
(N. Y.) 307 (1827) . Ross v. Sadgbeer, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 166 (1839) ;
Lirmv. Sigsbee, 67 Ill. 75 (1873); Cook
v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175 (1879); Miller
v. Elliott, I Ind. 484 (489); McOlurg's
Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 51 (1868); Gompers
v. Rochester, 56 Pa. St. 194 (1867);
Sainter v. Ferguson, 7 C. B. 716 (1849);
s. c. 13 Jur. 828; Morgan v. Perhamus,
36 Ohio. St. 517 (1881); s. o. 39 Am.
Rep. ; Pyke v. Thomas, 4 Bibb (Ky.)
184 (1867) " Am. Dec. 741; Benwell
v. lnns, 24 Beav. 307 (1857); s. c.
26 L. J. Ch. 663; Proctor v. Sargent, 2
Scott N. R. 289 (1840); s. o. 2 M. &
G. 30 ; Bunny. Gay, 4 East 190 (1803);
Middleton v. Brown, 47 L. J. (N. S.)
Ch. Div. 411 (1878); Noah v. Webb, 1
Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 606 (1833); Dakin
Williams, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 67 (1883);
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as within a town: Hastings v. Whitley

Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. (N.

2 Exch. 611 (1848); Alitchel v. Reynolds, Y.) 159 (1839); Dunlop v. Gregory,
10 N. Y. 241 (1851); Navigation Co.
1 P. Vms. 181 (1711); s. c. 1 Sm. L.
v. WTinsor, 6 Cal. '258 (1856); 20
C. 705 (7th Am. ed.); leading case on
Wall. 67 (1873) ; Angier v. Webber,
the subject: Jenkins v. Temples, 39 Ga.
14 Allen (Mass.) 211 (1867) ; or with
655 (1860); Hubbardr,Ailler, 27 Mich.
15 (1873); Harrisonv. Lockhart, 25 Ind. particular persons bearing some present
Marren
112 (1865); McAlister v. Howell, 42
relation to the covenantor:
Ind. 15 (1873); /eichew v. Hamilton, v. Jones, 51 Me. 146 (1862); Nicholls
3 G. Gr. (Iowa) 596 (1852); Gomper
v.Stretton, 10 Q. 3. 344 (1847); s.c. 7
Beav. 42; Rannie T. Irvine, 8 Scott N.
v. Rochester, 56 Pa. St. 194 (1869);
Hedge v. Lowe, 47 Iowa 137 (1877)
R. 674 (1844); S. C. 7 M. & G. 969;
8 Jur. 1051; 14 L. J. C. P. 10; Ward
Grundy v.Edwvards, 7 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.)
368; a. c. 23 Am. Dec. 409; Roller v. Hogan, 11 Abb.N. C. (N. Y.) 478;
Co. v. Ott, 14 Kans. 609 (1875); Clark (1882); Galev. Reed, 8 East8O (1860);
v. Crosby, 37 Vt. 188 (1864); Doty v. Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md.561 (1870);
Martin, 32 Mich. 462 (1875); Dwight or with reference to particular land :
Jones v. Edney, 3 Camp. 285 (1812);
v.Hamilton, 113 Mass. 175 (1873); Mfott
Cooper Y. Twlbill, Id. 285 note; Catt
v. Mlott, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 127 (1851);
Niver v. Rossman, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 50; v. Tourle, 38 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 665
Haldeman v. Simonton, 55 Iowa 144
(1812); s. c. 21 L.T. (N. S.) 188;
(1880); or city: Green v. Price, 13 M.
are valid.
& IV. 695 (1842); s. c. 16 M. & W.
MODERN OPINION UPON THE DOC695 (1845); Shackle v. Baker, 14 Yes.
469 (1803) ; 3lallan v. May, 11 M. & TRINE OV RESTRAINTS.-Indeed, the
W. 653 (1843); Goodman v. Henderson, whole doctrine has been considerably
impaired in its efficiency by the attacks
58 Ga. 567 ; Thomas v. Miles' Admr., 3
CHRISTIOhio St. 274 (1854): Beard v. Dennis, of such judges as MAuLr,
The first
6 Ind. 200 (1855); Weler v. Hersee, ANCY, HowE and others.
declared that, were the whole ques10 Hun (N. Y.) 432 (1877); Stewart v.
tion res integra, he was strongly
Challacombe, 11 Brad. (DI.) 379 (1882);
inclined to doubt whether he would
Piercev. Woodward, 6 Pick. 206 (1838);
sustain any rule which would denounce
or county or district: Lange v. Werk, 2
Ohio St. 519 ; Dean v. Emerson, 102 any contract in restraint of trade Mass. 480 (1869) ; Avery v. Langford, Proctor v. Sargent, 2 Scott N. R. 289,
I Kay 663 (1854); Richardson v. Pea- 302 (1840); 2 M. & G. 20. And
Judge CHRISTIANCY says, that any rule
cock, 33N. J. Eq. 597 (1881); aft. s.c.
28 N. J. Eq. 151 ; or on a particular
of law which should assume that one
who, for a consideration, bargains not
route: Boutelle v. Smith, 116 Mass. 111
(1874); Ewing v. Johnson, 34 How. Pr. to follow his previous business, bound
(N. Y.) 202 (1864); Perkins v. Clay, himself to idleness and want, would
be a rule absurd in itself, and contrary
54 N. H. 518 (1874); Mfumford v.
to general experience, and characterGething, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 428; s. c. 29
L.J.C.P.
105; 8W. R. 187; I L.
izes the rule as "a state policy which
T. (N. S.) 64; 7 C. B. (N. S.) 305;
has come down to us from semi-civilized
Homer v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322 (1825);
or less-enlightened times when governPierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223; Leighton ments were accustomed to prohibit artiv. Wales, 3 M. & W. 545 (1838); Archer zans from leaving the realm, and gold
and silver from being exported," "which
v. Marsh, 6 A. & E. 959 (1837); s. c.
is supposed to be violated by the trans2 N. & P. 562; 2 H. & W. 464;
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fer of the industry and capital of a citi- Crow v. White Wing, 3 Kans. 276, 279
zen across a river into another state :" (1865).
Per CaozIER, C. J.; Benz V.
Bea v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490 (1875).
Hines, 3 Kans. 390, 397 (1866) ; PhipAnd Judge HowE, in Kellogg v. Larkin, pen v. Stickney, 3 Met. (Mass.) 386.
3 Pinney (Wis.) 123 (1851) ; 3 Chand- See Feming v. Hutchinson, 36 Iowa
ler 133; 56 Am. Dec. 164, declares 523 (1873) ; Gardinerv. Morse, 25 Me.
that the maxim upon which the policy 140, 143 (1845) ; Durfee v. Moran, 57
is founded, is "the shibboleth of mere Mo. 374; Glhbs v. Smith, 115 Mass.
gambling speculation not entitled to take 592 (1874).
Per DEVEREUx, J.:
rank as an axiom in the jurisprudence Noyes v. DaN, 14 Vt. 384; Jones v. Casof this country."
"I believe," he well, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) Cas. 29
continues, "that universal observation (1802) ; or to give theni half the profits
will attest that for the last quarter of a to be realized by a sale: Wooten v.
century competition has caused more Hinkle, 20 Mo. 290 (1855); Nook v.
individual distress, if not more public Turner, 22 Id. 333 (1856); Lawnin
injury, than the want of competition."
v. Bradley, 13 Mo. App. 361 (1884);
Smith v. Greenlee, 2 Dev. (N. C.) 126
(1829); Story's Equity Jurisprudence
290 ; 1 Fonblauque's Eq., ch. 4, sect. 4,
n. x. ; Morris T. Woodward, 25 N. J.
Eq. (10 C. E. Gr.) 32 (1874); Horn
-r. Star Foundry Co., 23 W. Va. 522
(1884); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 5 Lans.
(N. Y.) 355 (1872) ;, Meech V. Bennett,
Lalor (N. Y. Supp.) 191 (1843);
Levi v. Levi, 6 C. & P. 239 (1833);
Hale v. Henderson, 4 Hum. (Tenn.)
199 (1843); Carrington V. Caller, 2
Stew. (Ala.) 175 (1829) ; Dudley v.
Little, 2 Ham. (Ohio) 504; or for the
disposition of such profits in consideration
of aid in some arrangement to defraud
the debtor or creditors ; if the object of
the combination is to purchase the proCOxBINATIONS TO STIFLE COMPE- perty at an unfair price or at a sacriTITION AT PUBLIC SALES VOID.-It is fice: Thompson v. Davies, 13 Johns.
this judicial dislike of any arrangement
(N. Y.) 112 (1816); Hawley v.
to liminishor stifle competition, which Cramer, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 731 ; Doolin
has-cised the courts to denounce as void v. Ward, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 194: Jones
any agreement or combination which has v. Caswell, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 32;
for its object the diminution of compe- Troup v. Wood, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)
tition at any public auction or judicial 254; Mills v. Rogers, 2 Littell (Ky.)
sales, as agreements to pay sums of 217 (1822); Woodruff v. Berry, 40
money, if the promisees will abstain Ark.
(1883), noted in 23 Am. Law
from bidding thereat: Ingram V. In- Reg., N. S. 276; Paige v. Hammond,
gram, 4 Jones (N. C.) L. 188 (1856) ; 26 Vt. 375 (1854); Martin V. Baulett,
2U Merchants' Ins. Co. v.Addison, 9 5 Rich. L. 542; Brackett V. Wyman,
Rob. (La.) 486 (1845); Packard v. 48 N. Y. 667 (1872). See Howell V.
Bird, 40 Cal. 378 (1870); Arnold V. Mills, 53 N. Y. 322; Jewett v. BowCord, 16 Ind. 177 (1861); Whizte man, 29 N. J. Eq. (2 Stew.) 174;

CbMPETITIO" THE GREAT DESIDxxuux.-It is plainly evident, from the
reasoning of the court in the principal case
1hat the court condemned the arrangement because of its object, i. e., to prevent competition in a business which has
beeome a popular' necessity, and to
keep the public under its combined controL It is this desire to keep the field
'of *ode open ,tounrestricted competition
ts ,iu
governed the courts in disposing
~aU suits in which combinations are
.The
very idea of a combinae* tion -isrevolting to the judicial mind.
It sees everything therein which is
aimed at the public weal, and can never
'detec anything productive of good.
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Bradley v. Kingsley, 43 N. Y. 534
COMBINATIONS
NOT STIFLING
(1871); and it is the object of the comTHOUGH DIMINISHING
COPETITION
bination, not the actual results accomAT PUBLIC SALES VALID.-But it does
plished by the execution of its purpose,
not follow from the foregoing that,
which determines its validity.
Per
though agreements may have the efDEvEXs, J., in Gibbs v. Smith, 115
fect of so diminishing competition, the
Mass. 592 (1874) ; Swam v. Chorpen- parties to them have an unlawful obning, 20 Cal. 182 (1862).
See James ject.
Therefore, any combination
v. Fulcrod, 5 Tex. 512 (1851), seem- which has a legitimate object, such as
ingly contra. It is immaterial in such the purchase of property for joint benecases whether the sale be of public or
fit: Phippenv. Stickney, 3 Met. (Mass.)
private property: H.ale v. Henderson, 4
384; Kearney v. Taylor, 15 How. (U.
Hum. (Tenn.) 199 (1843) ; Carrington S.) 494 (1853) ; Galton v. Emus, 8
v. Caller, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 175 (1829) ; Jur. 507 ; 13 L. J. Ch. 388; James V.
but it must be a public sale: Morrison 1idcrod, 5 Tex. 512 (1851) ; In re
v. Darling, 47 Vt. 67. It matters not
Carew's Estate, 26 Beav. 187 (1858) ;
whether the indebtedness be public or
S. C., 28 L. Ch., 218 ; Smith v. UIIprivate, when the sale is held for the man, 58 Md. 183 (1881); Hunt v.
satisfaction of indebtedness: Dudley v.
Elliott, 80 Ind. 245 (1881); s. c., 43
Little, 2 Ham. (Ohio) 504. It is imAm. Rep. 194; National Bank of the
matefial that the party seeking to pre- Metropolis v. Sprague, 20 N. J. Eq. (5
vent competition is the owner of the C. E. Gr.) 159 (1869); Grenier v.
property, or is a claimant of an interest Levoiux, I Leg. N. 231 (1878) ; or for
therein, or is otherwise directly inter- division of the property as the parties
ested in the prevention of competition : may desire when they are singly unable
Jones v. Caswell, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.)
or unwilling to purchase the whole, or
29 (1802); Packard v. Bird, 40 Cal.
for the protection of the interests of the
378 (1870); Gardinerv. M3orse, 25 Me.
parties is valid, though in its neces140 (1845) ; and the want of objection sary operation it diminishes competion the part of the vendor, or even the tion, there being no design, however, to
ratification of the sale by him after the procure the property at a sacrifice:
receipt of notice of the combination,
Mc3iinn v. Phipps, 3 Sneed (Tenn.)
imparts no validity to the agreement.
196 (1850); Ifissisoquoi Bank v. Sabin,
48 Vt. 239 (1876); Alaviev. Garrison,
See Hale v. Henderson, 4 Hum. (Tenn.)
199 (1843) ; Carrington v. Caller, 2 83 N. Y. 14 (1880); Barney. Drew, 4
Denio (N. Y.) 287 (1847); Smull v.
Stew. (Ala.) 175 (1829).
It follows
Jones, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 122 (1843);
that any sale procured through the
Galton v. Emus, 8 Jur. 507 (1864);
means of such an arrangement is void,
s. c. 13 L. J. Ch. 388; Freeman on
as it is a fraud upon the owner, debtor
Executions, sect. 297 ; Gardiner v.
or creditor, as it may be, for redress of
which lie may appeal to any court of
Morse, 25 Me. 140, 143 (1845) ; Piatt
equity: Dudley v. Little, 2 Ham. (Ohio)
v. Oliver, 1 McLean 295 (1837); s.C.
504; Martin v. Raulett, 5 Rich. (S. C.)
2 Id. 267 (1840); especially when the
violation of the contract would, by
Law 541 (1852).
See Reynolds v.
Pendleton, 22 Tex. 174; Hinde V. reason of other circumstances, be a vioPendleton, 'Vythe (Va.) 144; Lannin lation of duty to the promisee : Wadv. Bradley, 13 Mo. App. 363 (1884) ; del v. McCabe, 4 U. Can. Q. B. (0.
S.) 191 (1834); compare Brackett v.
National Bank of the Metropolis v.
Wyman, 48 N. Y. 667 (1872).
Sprague, 5 C. E. Gr. (20 N. J. Eq.)
159, 168 (1869).
COMBINATINSS TO DIMINISH COMPE-
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TITION FOR PUBLIC CONTRACTS VOID.

-So any c6mbintion which has for its
object, or is in its nature calculated to
diminish the competition for the obtain-

(1878), per FOLGER, J.; Breslin v
Brown, 24 Ohio St. a65 (1874).

COMBINATIONS TO CHECK BUSINESS
COMPETITION VOID.-"A combination
ment of the award of a public contract,
that has for its object to check competias agreements for the withholding of a
tion," says Chief Justice CooLs,
bid for work on a road in consideration
"seems to stand in hostility to the inof a promise of half the profits : Wilbur
dustrial maxim that ' competition is the
v. How, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 444 (1811).
life of trade,' a maxim which, from
See People v. Lord, 6 Hun (N. Y.)
time immemorial has been generally
390 (1876); or of a bid for a mail conprevalent and is commonly supposed to
tract, in consideration of a promise of a
be one admitting of no question and of
certain sum: Gulick v. Bailey, 10 N. J.
universal application. The advantages
Law (5 Halst.) 87 (1828) ; or an agreeof unrestricted competition are apparent
ment made by two before filing bids for
to the public in industrial life all about
the collection of taxes, to file both and
us, and while, in some kinds of busishare the profits, should either obtain
ness, this is sharp, yet selfishness is
the award: Atchison v. Mallon, 43 N.
generally sufficiently active and suffiY. 147 (1870); or an agreement to
ciently intelligent to prevent its becomsubstitute another in the place of the
ing ruinous. It does not detract from
party to -whom the award is made, in
the worth or soundness of the maxim
consideration of a bonus, the circumthat under the operation of unrestricted
stances justifying a suspicion that a
competition, individual disasters must
prior understanding had been made:
occur ; for when this happens it is very
Hannah v. life, 27 Mich. 172 (1873); likely to be found either that the parties
or an agreement not to bid for the con- did not understand the business they
tract for convict labor: Gibbs v. Snith,
were engaged in, or managed badly, or
115 Mass. 592 (1874); or to withdraw lacked the necessary capital, or in some
a bid for a mail route, is condemned by. other particulars were inadequately
I
the courts and enforceable only in the
equipped." (In an articleon " Railway
forumapf conscience: Swan v. Chorpen- Pools," appearing in The Railway Age,
ifg, 20 Cal. 182 (1862).
of April 26th, 1884.)
COMBIiATIONS

TO

SECURE PUBLIC

CONTRACTS VALID WnEN.-But as in
the case of combinations to procure property at public sales, the combinations
just considered may have a legitimate
object, such as the formation of a partnership for the obtaining of government work, or they may be explained
by the 'surrounding circumstances, which
show that no injury to the public was
To interpose the objection
possible.
of public policy in such cases, would
violate the plain rule that the case should
be clear to justify a judicial condemnation and they will therefore be upheld :
Bellows v. Russell, 20 N. H. 427 (1845);
Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147

COMBINATIONS TO CREATE " CORxcas."-All combinations to create a
" corner" in the stock market: Sampson v. Shaw, 101 Mass. 145 (1869);
or whea market: Raymond v. Leavitt,
46 Mich. 447 (1881); s. c. 41 Am.
Rep. 170; Wright v. Crabbs, 78 Ind.
487 (1881) ; by buying more than there
is in the market in order to force the
price up to a point for the purpose of
making profit on those who have been
selling and are unable to deliver are
void, and those who advance their
money to others engaged therein can
look to no court for redress.
COMBINATIoNs

TO CONTROL TRAF-

;
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-xc.-Combinations which have for
their object the control of the traffic in
any staple which has become a popular
necessity, to say the least, are void.
And where all the grain dealers of a
large town in Illinois entered into a
secret arrangement to control the price
of grain,'storage rates, shipment charges,
etc., and to divide the profits of the
pool, the court deemed the object so
pernicious that it refused its aid to one
of the parties to obtain his share of the
profits, after the purpose of the pool
had been fulfilled: Craft v. McConough,
79 Ill. 346 (1875). Compare, Kellogg
v. Larken, 3 Pinney (Wis.) 124 (1851);
citing M3orris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay
Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173. "1While all
the parties were in business with each
other in competition, said the court
"they had the undoubted right to establish their own rates for grain stored, and
commissions charged, for shipment and
sale. They could pay as high or low a
price for grain as they saw fit, and as
they could make contracts with the producer. So long as competition was
free, the interests of the public was safe.
The laws of trade in connection with the
rigor of competition was all the guaranty the public required, but the secret
combination created by the contract destroyed competition and created a monopoly, against which the publicinterest
had no protection."
C031BINATIONS TO ENHANCE PRICES.

-Combinations, which have for their
object the enhancement of prices of such
popular necessities, as coal or salt, when
the parties have such a control over
their production as to require the public
to feel their influence, are void. So
where five coal companies entered into
an arrangement to divide two great coal
regions of which they had control, to
appoint a committee to take charge of
their interests, which was to decide all
questions and also a general agent,
through whom all coal mined was to be
delivered, each corporation to deliver
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its proportion at its own cost, in the
different markets, as the committee might
direct, the committee to adjust prices,
rates of freight, etc., the companies to
sell at no other price and in none begond
their severalproportions, the arrangement
was denounced by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in the most vehement
manner: 3forris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173 (1873) ;
singly, each might have suspended operations, or deliveries or sales of coal, to
suit its own interests, even though this
might have been detrimental to the pubUc interests. There is a certain amount
of freedom which must be allowed every
one in managing his own affairs. When
competition is left free, individual error
or folly will generally find a correction
in the conduct of others. But here was
a combination of all the companies,
operating in the Blossburg and Barclay
mining regions, and controlling their'
entire productions.
They combined
together to govern their supply, and the
price of 6oal, in all the markets, from
the Hudson to the Mississippi and from
Pennsylvania to the lakes. They had a
power, in their confederated form,
which no individual interest could confer. The public interest must have
succumbed to it, for it left no competition free to correct its baleful influence.
We all know that when the supply is
suspended, the demand for it becomes
importunate and prieesmmust rise. The
domestic hearth, the furnaces of the
iron-master, and the fires of the ,manufacturer, all feel the restraint, while
many dependent hands are paralyzed
and hungry mouths are stinted. The
influence of a lack of supply, or a rise
in prices of such an article of such prime
necessity cannot be measured. It permeates the entire mass of the community
and leaves few of its members untouched
by its withering blight. Such a combination is more than a contract, said the
court, it is an offence.
SAME

SUBJECT.-SALT

COZBIXA-

HOFFM.YLN v. BROOKS.
TIO-.-And .in a case involving a
salt combination of the same character, the court said: "The clear
tendency of such an agreement, is to
establish a monopoly and to destroy
competition in trade, and for that
reason, on grounds of public policy,
courts will not aid in its enforcement.
It is no answer to say that competition
in the salt trade was not in fact destroyed, or that the price of the commodity was not unreasonably advanced..
Courts will not stop to inquire as to the
degree of injury inflicted upon the
public ; it is enough to know that the
inevitable tendency of such contracts is
injurious/to the public:" The Central
Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St.
666 (1880).
COMBINATIONS

TO WITHHOLD

STA-

combihations which have for their object the
withholding of staples which have become prime necessities of the people are
void. So, where two coal companies
agreed that one should take all the coal
of the other, not exceeding a maximum
number of tons, the latter to sell to no
other party any coal to come north of the
state line during the season of canal navigation, the plain object of the compact
being to keep all the coal mined by the
one out of the market, except the limited
supply, and thus to artificially enhance
the price of thatnecessary commodity,
it was denounced by the New York
Court of Appeals as a combination to
effect a purpose inimical to the interests
of the public: Arnot v. The Pittston and
Elmira Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558 (1877) ;
s.c. 2 Hun 591 ; 5 S. C. 143; citing
Morris Run Cool Co. v. Barclay Coal
Co., 68Penn. St. 173 (1873).
PLES

FoR

MARKT.-All

PRICES ENHANCED 3Y SUCH COMSNATIONS NOT TRUE vALE.-When. ever it so happens that delivery is not
made of goods according to contract, at
a time when the price of such goods is
inflated by combinations of the char-

acter of those which have been considered, the price thus enhanced is not
the true measure of damages. That is,
the fair, natural price of the goods:
Kountz v. Kirkpatrick, 72 Penn. St.
376 (1872); Ko.untz v. Citizens' Oil
Refinery, Id. 392. (SHARSWooD and
WILLI.MS, JJ., dissenting).
COMBINATIONS TO CONTROL PRICES
WHEN VALID.-Much as the courts are
opposed to combinations to control prices,
it is likewise true that a combination
among men engaged in business which
has become ruinous to raise prices to a
reasonable point, especially when its
operation is limited in every essential
particular, is valid. So, where the competition among all the quarrymen in a
certain district in St. Louis had become
so sharp that the business had become
ruinous, and to put an end to this,
twenty-four of them formed a combination or pool for the purpose of developing the business into a profitable one,
and to raise the prices to a fair point,
no one to sell any rubble building stone;
the produce of any quarry in the district
for less than a fixed price, the pool was
sustained. The object of the combination was to prevent the parties from
being driven out of the business, and in
no wise tended to monopoly, and it did
not appear to be detrimental to the public interest. It did not" deprive men of
employment, unduly raise prices, cause
a monopoly, or put an end to competition." It tended to no contravention
of any established interest of society or
right of the public, consequently there
was no sound reason why it should be
declared void: Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522 (1880).
REGULATION OF PniCEs.-It is clear
that a partnership may fix in its formation the minimum price for that which is
its object to sell or furnish to the public,
provided there be no intention to control
prices or create a monopoly. So, where
several parties during the late war
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formed a partnership for the purpose
of raising recruits to sell to the government, a stipulation that no recruit
should be offered for less than a certain
sum, did not make the partnership illegal: farsh v. Russell, 66 N. Y. 288
(1876) ; reversing s. c. 2 LaBs. 340.
COMBINATIONS AMONG THOSE ENGAGED IN PUBLIC BUsINESS.-A com-

mon carrier, as every one knows, cannot
like a merchant or mechanic consult his
pleasure or caprice as to the conduct of
his business. The law makes it his
duty, when he can conveniently do so,
to receive and carry goods for any person whomsoever, for a reasonable rate.
The public does not forbid carriers from
guarding themselves against undue competition, reducing freights below the
standard of fair compensation, but -the
law will tolerate no combination among
common carriers or persons engaged in
any public business, made such by
statute or such by common law, for the
purpose of fixing rates without reference
to their reasonableness. And where
several carriers combined as an association, the object of which was to
reduce competition and provide an uniform charge for carriage, and provided
a fine for carrying freight for less than
the fixed rate, the association was nonsuited in its action to recover the fine
from a rebellious member: 1§4y-es v.
Louisville Benevolent Assocation, I DnTall (Ky.) 143 (1863). So, where the
proprietors of five lines of boats engaged
in the transportation of persons and
freight, combine and stipulate that they
shall all charge certain prices, the net
earnings of all to be divided according
to certain fixed proportions, the agreement was held void: Hooker v. Yanderater, 4 Wend. 349 (1847) ; Stanton v.
Allen, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 435 (1848).
RAILWAY rooLs.-One would naturally suppose from what has already
been said with regard to common carriers that a railway pool is unquestionVOL. XXXII.-84

ably void. They, above all, are types
of public business concerns. They enjoy the power of eminent domain, but
reciprocate with the sunender of power
to thc public to control them as public
servants. Yet it is contended that railways should be allowed to enter into
pools because they occupy a different
position from that held by others engaged in public business. They sink
their capital into railroads by which
they must stand, in the event of success
or failure, while other carriers can the
moment business becomes unprofitable
transfer their resources to other scenes
of action or make sale of their property.
It is further claimed that competition
necessarily affects them in a way different to that in which it affects others ;
so different that it may be destructive to
them, where to others it would only be
stimulating and wholesome; that it
becomes a necessity; sometimes that
the competition which is becoming
destructive, should be restricted within
limits which admit, of reasonable and
reliable prosperity, and that some
common arrangement
between the
roads seems to be the only means yet
found by which this can be accomplished,
and that having grown out of the necessities of the case, it is unjust to no one ;
that free competition is often prejudicial
to public convenience ; and that when
the competition between two rivals
becomes ruinous, one must give way,
and the rates for service to the public go
up to the injury of the public, which
might have been prevented by permitting arrangements to be made for
fair rates.
SAME SUBJECT-VIEW OP THE
counTs.-The courts in this country
have never, so far as we have been able
to discover, decided the legality or illegality of these railway pools, though a
dictum may be found here and there indicatiug that a denunciation of them
may be expected when the question is
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fairly raised. See Denver 6- 0. R. R.
Co. v. Atchison, T.,4. S. Fe By. Co.,
15 Fed. Rep. 650 (1882). They have
been sustained in England, however:
The Shrewsbury &' Birmingham R. TV.
Co. v. The London and North-Western
R. Co., 3M. & G. 70 (1850) ; s. o. 2
t. J. Q. B. 89 (1851); 17 A. & E.
(N. S.) Q. B. 652; s.c. 4DeG. M.
& G. 115 (1853); 6 H. of L. Cas. 651
(1857); s. c. 16Beav. 441,450 (1853);
Harev. L.4-N. IV.R. Co., 2 J. &H.
80, 7 Jur. N. S. 1145 (1861); 30 L.
J. Ch. 87; when made to prevent
Vice-Chancellor
ruinous competition.
W. PAGE WOOD, remarking in one
case: Hare v. R. TV Co., just cited,
that it was "a mistaken notion that
the public is benefitted by pitting two
railroad companies against each other,
until one is ruined, the result being at
last to raise the fares, to the highest
possible standard." To this it may be
replied that the legislature may prevent
the consequence mentioned, by prescribing a maximum schedule of fares. The
legislature may do that, it is true; but
it cannot compel a -corporation to operate, wheni to operate it requires the
power to do the very thing, which ViceChancellor WOOD claimed that they
would be forced to do.
SAME

SUBECT -

THE

CORMECT

vIE.w-If the principle which governed the courts of New York and Kentacky in the cases before referred to, is
to be applied to railway pools, it is certain that they will never receive any judicial sanction in this country. But in
the New York cases, the plain object,
as seen' by the court, was to create a
monopoly to the demands of which the
public must give obedience, and the
court in the Kentucky case expressly
admitted that if the object of the parties
to the combination had been to equali'im
rates, upon a reasonablebasis, they would
have upheld the combination, as commendable. These cases, as far as the
courts in them were obliged to go, are

undoubtedly correct expositions of the
law; but they do not condemn railway
pools with legitimate objects.
INsuAxrC rPooL.-It is certain that
those engaged in insurance business are
not in a business which can be called
public, for individually each insurance
company can fix its own rates, which a
carrier cannot do, and it may insure
where and for whom it will, which a'
common carrier has no power to do.
We know of no rule of law which would
forbid it to discriminate, ad libitum. It
can hardly be called a prime necessity;
yet it has become a public convenience,
or perhaps, more properly speaking, a
convenient necessity. No agent for the
care of property would be doing his duty
did he neglect to insure his charge in
No man is
some reliable company.
regarded a safe business man who refuses to deal with the underwriters. It
has, therefore, becorne a business necessity; commerce demands it; and the
danger to commerce from a combination of underwriters is identical with
that which might arise from a combiThis is
nation among coal owners.
'the view taken of insurance pools by the
Superior Court of Indiana in a recent
case wherein an insurance agent was
sued for the penalty prescribed by the
pool to which he belonged for violation
of the schedule of rates. " A contract
that destroys rivalry in business and
stifles competition in fixing rates of insurance," says the court, "is as prejudicial to the public interest as if it were
a combination of merchants and tradesmen to maintain an unalterable standard
for the price of cloth or calico or butter.
To condemn a combination formed to
prevent competition for the furnishing
of the materials used in the construction
of a house or in the work of its erection,
and yet uphold a contract that will prevent competition in insuring it, is to lose
sight of substance and pursue a shadow.
The law by reason of its adaptability, is
able to meet the varying phases of all

HOFFMAN v. BROOKS.
business transactions.
That the tendency of this contract is to destroy
rivalry in the business, and to prevent
that active competition which would
otherwise exist, is too plain for serious
controversy." Metzger v. Cleveland and
Adams, Sup. Ct. Indiana ; 3 Ind. Law.
Mag. 42 (1883).
CoxmINATIOS TO OBTAIN CONTROL
holding stock
in a corporation has certainly an interest
in its affairs. He has his views regarding the proper management of affairs,
and he may in the best of faith believe,
the interests of the corporation to be
mismanaged. He may believe that its
directors do not turn their attention in
legitimate directions, where the corporate exchequer may receive a perceptible accretion.
Other stockholders are
of the same opinion. They do not, as
it so happens, have a majority of the
stock, and they form a combination to
use their combined capital in the stock
market to purchase sufficient stock to
enable them to obtain control of the corporation to carry out their views. Such
a combination will be sustained by law,
even though the prominent actor therein
is interested largely in a rival company,
when there appears to be no intention
to prevent competition between them.
Havemeeer v.Havemeyer, 48 N. Y. Sup.
Ct. (1 Jones & S.) 506 (1878).
OF CORPORATIONS.-One

CO3BINATIONS

TO CONTROL STOCK.

-We have already seen that "corners"
find no favor in the courts. The idea
of controlling an important interest by
margins is revolting to them. But suppose that one desires to purchase stock
and several combine to purchase all of
that stock that there is in the market, so
that they may make a good joint sale
thereof to the desirous purchaser, is such
a combination illegal ? It has been sustained by the Court of Common Pleas
of New York, and one of the parties
violating the agreement between the
parties to hold his stock was held bound

to pay the damages accruing from his
breach. Havemeyer v. favemeyer, 11
Jones & Sp., 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 506,
516 (1878).
COtMINATIONS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF RIVALRY AND SECURIEMENT OF

mONOPOLY.-Two railway corporations
for the purpose of securing a monopoly
of the business in the southwest, formed
a combination to crush all rivals by an
agreement "not to contract with or take
any business from or give business to any
railroad which might be constructed in
It was
Colorado or New Mexico."
denounced as void, the court saying,
"that is to say, these powerful corporations having secured a monopoly of the
carrying business in two states, will hold
it indefinitely and refuse to recognize
any rival that may enter the field.
Argument is not necessary to show that
a compact of this kind is against public
policy and void :" Denver 4- N. 0.
RailroadCo. v. Atchison, Topeka 4- anta
Fe Railroad Co., 15 Fed. Rep. 150
(1883).
COMBINATxONS

IN PRIVATE

BUSI-

NESS.-A combination to raise rates for
private service, within reasonable limits,
or to prevent competition, is valid.
While it may be doubtful whether the
case is actually decided, when taken in
connection with Mfunn v. Illinois, 4 Otto
125, the Texas case illustrates the
principle. Several warehousemen of
cotton combined in the city of Galveston, and fixed rates of storage, they
having virtual control of the business.
The court declared it to be a private
business, and that what they could do
individually in a city they might accomplish in the form of an association:
Ladd v. The Southern Cotton Press and
Manufacturing Co., 53 Texas 172
(1880) ; Selligson v. Taylor Compress
Co., 56 Id. 219 (1882). So, where
several stevedores in a certain port divided the firms of the place among them,
they agreeing not to interfere with those
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assigned to any member of the com- later dicta of judges of ability tend in
bination, and ik any business should the same direction: Rex v. Mawbey,
be transacted for them by any of the 6 T. R. (D. & E.) 619 (1796) ; but
others, the money earned should belofig the sober judgment of the courts has
to him to whom such firm was assigned, finally made it certain that artisans and
the combination was sustained ; Collins workingmen may continue, at their
v. Locke, L. R., 4 App. Cas. 674 pleasure, to increase their wages: B~os(1879) ; s. c. 48 L. J., P. C. 68; 41 ton Glass Co. v. Binney, 4 Pick. 425 ;
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111,
L. T., N. S. 292; 28 W. R. 189.
135 (1842) ; Te .3asters'Stevedores'
SAME SUBECT.-VOID WHEN.-But
Association v. Walsh, 2 Daly (N. Y.)
where they went beyond this provision, 1 (1867) ; Reg. v. Shepherd, 11 Cox.
and stipulated that should any of those C. C. 325 (1869) ; 34 & 35 Viet. C.
firms be dissolved or make sale of their 31 ; or to improve the condition of their
business, and its successor should refuse branch of industry: Snow v. Wheeler,
to give his work to him who had the 113 Mass. 179 (1873). See Walker v.
share of his predecessor, all should Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Carew v.
decline to have any connection with Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1; Sheridan's
him, it was denounced as a restriction
Case (1868) ; cited in Wright on Conupon the others, without any corres- spiracy, 50; Reg. v. Shepherd, 11 Cox
ponding benefit to him or others, and as C. C. 325 (1869); so long as they do
obviously detrimental to the public in not interfere with the freedom of action
depriving the merchants of the power of
of others: Rex v. Bykerdike, I M. &
employing any of the parties, however Rob. 179; or encourage strikes:
well founded their objections to the .ornby v.C7ose, L. R., 2 Q. B. 152; Faremployment of the protesting member ren v. Close, L. R., 4 Q. B. 602 (1869);
might be: Collins v. Locke, just cited.
or seek to intimidate: R. v. Rowlands,
17 Q. B. N. S. 671; s. c. 5 Cox C.
COMBIntATIONS AMONG WORKMXN.Political economists have quarrelled with C. 436; Reg. v. Duffield, 5 Cox C. C.
each other over the beneficent effects of 404; Reg. v. Hewitt, Id. 162; Reg. v.
strikes and trades unions, and judges Ribbert, 13 Id. 82 ; Reg. v. Bunn, 12
have shared in their differences. The Id. 216 (1872); or impoverish others to
Supreme Court of New York, some gain their ends: People v. Fisher, 14
half a century ago, conceived them to be Wend. 9 ; State v. Donaldson, 32 N. 1T.
dangerous to trade, and went as far as L. (3 Vt.) 151 (1661); People v. Melto say that a combination among work- lon, 1 Yates Sel. Cas. 112; Rex v.
Ingmen, not to labor for less than cer- Bykerdike, I M. & Rob. 179 ; Rex v.
tain wages, was an offence against the Ferguson, 2,Stark. 431 (1819).
people and punishable as such: People
v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9; People v. Tre-

quier, 1 Wheeler's Cr. Cas. 142 (1823).
There are some expressions in some old
cases, which lend support to the theory
that such combinations or trades-unions
are hostile to the public interest, and
should be denounced by the courts : King
v. Ecdes, 3 Doug. 337 (1783). See
2
23
RexT. Turner, 3 East. 2 ,8, 1 (1816);
King v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge, 8 Mod. 10 (1721) . and some

COMBINATIONS

AMONG

MANUFAC-

TURER.-A combination among manufacturers to compel submission on the
part of their operatives to their ideas of
wages, would have no permanent injury
as there are always those who are prepared to take advantage of the unpopularity of manufacturers and opportunities to make money, with poorly paid
labor. But yet they work temporary
mischief to the public, and public policy
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permits none. Such combination are
therefore void, when their object is to
reduce wages below a reasonable standard, but if their only object be to reestablish the old wages from which they
had been forced to depart by a combination of their operatives, it is doubtful if
the combination be illegal. Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightly (Pa.) 36
(1821) s. c. Vol. 1 Hall's Journal of
Jurisprudence 225.
COMBINATIONS

RESTRICTING FREE-

DOM1 OF MINORITY AT WILL OF MAJOR-

ITY.-The disputes between capital and
labor, which have been the curse of
England, are familiar to everyone. During one of these all the master manufacturers in two large towns combined,
making a compact by which all the
parties were bound to carry on the business as the majority would decide, even
to the shutting up of factories and dismissal of operatives. This of course
was intended to make the operatives
dread the consequences of such possible
combination. It took away the freedom
of action of the individual to carry on
the trade and to open and close his
works according to his own and the
public interest. It seems obviously
mischievous that he should give up this
right of judging for himself and place
himself and the trade under he dictatian either of a majority or of a committee of delegates, which seems the same
principle. A manufacturer may work
his men or not as he may deem best, but
as soon as he binds himself by penalties
to give up his right of retiring from such
combination, that freedom of trade which
,it is the policy of the law to protect,
seems directly interfered with. If such
a compact were legal, agreements by
workingmen on strike to continue in the
strike would be enforceable. Such were
the reasous which impelled the court,
against the protest of ERLE, J., to denounce the combination as void. Hilton
v. Edcersly, 6 El. &Bl. 48 (1855).

PARTNERSHIPS

IN

PUBLIC BUSINESS

VALID.-Associations are so common an
element in all the affairs of life that it
would be assuming too much to assert
that they impair competition, destroy
emulation, and diminish exertion. There
is scarcely an occupation in life, scarcely
a branch of trade from the very largest
to the smallest, that does not feel the
exciting and invigorating influence of
"It
this wonderful instrumentality.
made and conducts our government;
constructs our railroads; our steam
vessels ; our magnificent ships; our
temples pf worship; structures for public and private use ; our manufactories ;
creates our institutions for learning;
builds up our cities and towns. Its very
office is to do what individual exertion
may not accomplish and in a degree,
distinguishes civilized from savage life."
Therefore, when the pilots in a harbor
combined and formed a partnership or
association for the division of profits and
sharing of losses, it was held that there
was nothing in the case which demanded
that "this important agency should be
denied to this meritorious class of our citizens." They were said to be "in general, men of small means, to whom an
association may not only be desirable,
but necessary and indispensable:" Jonaes
v. Fell, 5 Fla. 510 (1854).
PARTNERSHIPS FOR SALE OF WAR
RECRUtTs.-There is nothing in a partnership for the sale of war recruits to
the government which is aginst public
policy when there is no duty on the part
of the partners to procure them for the
government. Such a business is as legitimate as any other: Marshv. Russell,
66 N. Y. 288 (1876); overruling s. c.
2 Lans. N. Y. 340 ; compare Shedy v.
Phillips, 54 Ill. 809 (1870).
CoMIRNATIxs TO DENY AVANTAGES TO THE PUB.Ic.-Sometimes it
happens that the keepers of rival places
of public amusements, in their efforts to
make the selection of the places of one
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more desirable than that of the other,
offer inducemtnt to parties to come to it.
They come to the conclusion that such
conduct is unfair, and preferring to
rely upon .the merits of their places,
make a contract to be no longer parties
to such a system of unfair competition.
Such a combination is valid : Koehler v.
Feuerbacher, 2 Mo. App. 11 (1876).
And it would seem that if the merchants
in a town should make a compact to
employ no drummers for trade, or if
hotel keepers should agree not to employ
runners, the courts would sustain the
compaet : Per BAic wELr, J., Ibid.
COtBINATIONS TO SECURE LEGITIMATE ADVANTAGES

BUT NOT ALLOWED

BY L~w.-It is well known that only
the artizan had a lien upon the subject
upon which he bestowed his labor, as
security for the payment of the value of
his services. Suppose those engaged in
a business allowed no such len, as cer-

tain bleachers and dyers once did, combine and agree to take no work unless
allowed a lien upon the goods, would
such a compact be valid ? Lord K.Ew-ox could see nothing in such a combination which was repugnant to his
notions of honesty or public policy. It
was merely an agreement by those who
had the option either to work for this or
that person, as they chose that they
would not receive the goods of any
person who would not consent that they
should be retained for a general balance
that might happen to be due to them.
The case of innkeepers he declared to
be entirely distinct, because these are
bound to receive guests and to protect
their property. The compact, "so far
from being illegal," was "founded on
justice :"

Kirkman v. Sallcross, 6 T.

R. (D. & E.) 14 (1794).
ELISHA GRENHOOD.
St. Louis.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
HOVERSON v. NOKER.
Plaintiff was injured by the frightening of her horse by two boys, who shouted
and fired istols as she passed their father's premises. In an action against the
father, held, that it was proper to show that such acts had been previously performed by the boys, sometimes in their father's presence.
To make the father responsible it is necessary to connect him with the acts of the
sons, and show that he permitted that to be done upon his premises which was
likely to result in damage to passers by. But it is not necessary that he should
have directed his sons to do the wrongful act by express words of command.
Where a husband is a party with his wife in, an action for damages for injury by
third parties to her, be is a competent witness for the plaintiffs, so long as he remains
a party to the record.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court, Kewaunee county.
B. L. Wing and W. 17. Timlin, for appellant.
Nash & Nash, for respondents.

TAYLoR, J.-The plaintiffs in this action are husband and wife,
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and the defendants are father and his two sons. The action was in
the nature of an action on the case for an injury to the wife, caused,
as alleged in the complaint, by the joint acts of the defendants. The
evidence on the trial shows pretty clearly that while the plaintiffs
were passing along the highway with their team and wagon in front
of the defendant's house on a Sunday, going to church, the two
young sons of the defendant, Frank Noker, came out of their father's
house and fired off a pistol and shouted, and so frightened the plaintiffs' horses that they jumped suddenly forward and threw Sarah
Hoverson out of the seat and injured her; and in the afternoon, on
their return from the church, the boys again fired the pistol and
shouted and again frightened the plaintiffs' horses, but did not
injure Mrs. Hoverson to as great an extent as in the morning. The
jury, under the instructions of the court, found a special verdict,
and assessed the plaintiff's damages at the sum of five dollars.
From the judgment entered on such verdict Sarah Hoverson
appeals to this court.
The case, though not involving any great amount of money, has
been argued by counsel orally and in the submitted briefs with a
degree of ability and care highly commendable. The learned
counsel for the appellant presents several points upon the rulings
of the court upon the trial rejecting evidence offered by him, for
which he claims the judgment should be reversed. It will be seen
by an examination of the record that it became important for the
plaintiffs to connect the father with the acts of his young sons,
which the plaintiffs allege caused the injury complained of, and for
this purpose the plaintiffs offered evidence tending to prove that the
sons had frequently, before the day upon which the accident happened, called abusive names, shouted, and frequently discharged
fire-arms when persons were passing the house of the defendants,
and that this was often done in the presence of their father. All
evidence of this kind was excluded. This, we are inclined to hold,
was error. If the father permitted his young sons to shout, use
abusive language, and discharge fire-arms at persons who were passing along the highway in front of his house, he permitted that to
be done upon his premises which, in its nature, was likely to resiflt
in damage to those passing, and when an injury did happen from,'
that cause he was not only morally but legally responsible for the
damage done. If a parent permits his very young children to
become a source of damage to those who pass the highway in front
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of his house, he is as much liable for the injury as though he permitted them to 'erect some frightful or dangerous object near the
highway which would frighten passing teams; and in such case he
cannot screen himself by saying that he did not in words order the
erection to be made. If he made it himself, with the intention to
frighten passing teams, he would be responsible for the injury
caused by it; and when he permits his irresponsible children to do
it he is equally liable, because he has the control of his premises
as well as of the children, and is bound to restrain them from causing a dangerous thing to be erected on his premises near the highway; and permitting his young sons to become an object of fright
to teams passing, is certainly equally if not mbre reprehensible
than permitting an inanimate structure to be placed where it would
cause such fright. We think the evidence ought to have been
admitted in order to connect the father with the acts of the young
sons which caused the injury when the plaintiffs were on their way
to church in the morning, as well as when on their return from the
church in the afternoon.
The next error complained of is the refusal of the court to permit the husband to be examined as a witness on the trial. Although
the action was for the recovery of damage done to the person of the
wife, still the husband was a party to the action, and under the
decisions of this court he was a competent witness for the plaintiffs.
It seems to us that the ruling of the court below was in direct conflict
with the decisions of this court in Hacket v. Bonnell, 16 Wis. 471,
which decision was approved and affirmed by this court in the case
of Snell v. Bray, 56 Wis. 156-161. See also, Rolmes v. Fond du
Lac, 42 Wis. 282; Kaime v. Village of Omro, 49 Id. 871, and
Barnes v. Martin, 15 Id. 240. We think the husband was a competent witness in the case so long as he remained a party to the
record, and it was error not to permit him to be examined.
Other exceptions to the rejection of evidence were taken, but it
is unnecessary to consider'them, as they will not be likely to occur
upon a new trial.
The nonsuit in favor of the father upon the first cause of action
stated in the complaint was, we think, improperly granted, even
upon the evidence admitted by the court. There was at least some
evidence admitted upon which the jury might have held the father
liable for the acts done in the morning. On the case made by the
plaintiffs, under the too strict rule held by the court as to the admis-
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sion of evidence, there was still enough to carry the case to the
jury upon both the causes of action stated in the complaint ; at
least, so far as the father was concerned.
The exceptions to the rulings as to the form of the special verdict need not be considered, as there must be a new trial for the
errors above suggested. We deem it proper, however, to say that
the judge, in his instructions upon the following question submitted
to them: "Did the defendant Frank Noker direct his sons, the other
two defendants, to make the noise they did when the plaintiffs were
passing the house with their team ?" fell into an error when he
instructed them "that in order to answer this question in the
affirmative they must be satisfied from tho evidence that he by word
so directed his sons to make the noise." This was too strict a limitation upon the subject. The evidence-might have satisfied the
jury that he directed the acts of his sons, but they might be unable
to find evidence that he did so direct it by express words of command. Certainly no express command to do as they did was necessary to hold the father liable for their acts.
For the errors mentioned the judgment must be reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded
for a new trial.
The number of cases touching the first
point decided in the principal case is
not large. Mr. Schouler, in his valuable work on The Domestic Relations,
263, lays down the rule thus : "On the
whole, it may be stated as a rule, that a
father is not liable in damages for the torts
of his child, committed without his knowledge, consent or sanction, and not in the
course of his employment of the child."
The doctrine so well stated is amply
supported by authority : C2'andler v.
Dealon, 37 Tex. 406 ; Paulinv. Howser,
63 Ill. 312 ; Edwards v. Crume, 13
Kans. 348 ; Tip v. Tfft, 4 Den. 175 ;
Bahn v. Haldeman, 24 Mo. 219; Paul
v. Hunmd, 43 Id. 119; -Moon v.
Towers, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 611. In the
case last cited, the defendant's son, a
youth about 17 or 18, in his employ,
caused a servant whom he suspected of
obtaining money from him by false pretences, to be apprehended and taken
VOL. XXXII-85

before a magistrate, who remanded
him, but ultimately discharged him.
After the remand the son told his father
what he had done; the latter did not
prohibit his son from proceeding in the
matter, but said that, as he (the son)
had begun it, he would not interfere.
Hedd, by ELE, C. J., WILLES, J.
and BYLES, J., dubitante WILLIAMS, J.,
that there was no evidence for a jury,
either of previous authority or subsequent ratification by the father.
The cases in which the father has been
held liable are very few, and are all, so
far as we can learn, based upon authority, express or implied, to do the
unlawful act. Thus, in StroM v. Levan, 39 Penn. St. 177, it was held that
trespass would lie against a father for
an injury committed by his team, when
driven by a son with whom he was
riding at the time. THomPsoN, J.,
said : "Here the son was driving, and

